## Facts

- Melissa Forshee worked as a temporary employee at Waterloo Industries’ Pocahontas, Arkansas facility beginning May 31, 1995.
- On June 17, 1995, her supervisor, Brian Ross, allegedly told her he could make it easier for her to be hired full-time if she provided sexual favors.
- Forshee refused the sexual demand.
- On June 19, 1995, Ross stated he was unhappy with her performance and sent her back to the staffing agency, ending her temporary assignment.
- Forshee sued Waterloo under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination based on discharge for refusing a supervisor’s sexual demands.
- A jury found for Forshee and awarded back pay ($10,369) and compensatory damages for emotional distress ($9,631); the district court later awarded attorneys’ fees and set lead counsel’s rate above his normal hourly rate based on contingency risk.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence permitted the jury to find Title VII liability for discriminatory discharge based on refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, such that JMOL was properly denied.
2. Whether the jury was properly instructed on back-pay damages and whether the back-pay award conformed to Title VII’s remedial limits.
3. Whether the emotional-distress damages claim was properly submitted to the jury and supported by sufficient evidence.
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by increasing counsel’s hourly rate above his normal rate based solely on the case’s contingency risk.

## Decision

- The court affirmed denial of JMOL, holding the evidence permitted a finding that a tangible employment action (termination) resulted from Forshee’s refusal to submit to her supervisor’s sexual demands.
- The court reversed in part the back-pay award and remanded for modification consistent with Title VII’s make-whole framework.
- The court reversed in part the emotional-distress award and remanded for reduction/modification consistent with the proof of emotional harm.
- The court reversed the enhanced hourly-rate component of the attorneys’ fee award, holding that increasing the rate above counsel’s normal rate based solely on contingency considerations was an abuse of discretion, and remanded to recalculate fees using the normal rate.

## Legal Principles

- Under Title VII, if a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from refusing a supervisor’s sexual demands, the employment decision itself constitutes actionable discrimination.
- Labels such as “quid pro quo” are not determinative; the central question is whether discriminatory conduct culminated in a tangible employment action affecting terms and conditions of employment.
- Title VII back pay is a make-whole remedy limited to restoring the position the plaintiff would have occupied absent discrimination, subject to appropriate temporal and evidentiary constraints.
- Compensatory damages for emotional distress may be awarded under Title VII when supported by competent evidence, but the amount must be tied to the proof presented.
- Statutory fee awards are generally based on the lodestar (reasonable hours times a reasonable market rate); contingency risk alone does not justify enhancing an hourly rate above the attorney’s normal rate.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit sustained the jury’s finding that Forshee was discharged in violation of Title VII after refusing her supervisor’s sexual demand, but required reductions or recalculation of the back-pay and emotional-distress awards and vacated an attorneys’ fee rate enhancement that was justified only by contingency risk.


Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 1999)