Facts
- B.W. Foster operated a mink ranch near North Bend, Washington, with caged mink housed in multiple sheds.
- The ranch was near a highway and railroad lines; the mink had become accustomed to routine traffic and train noise and vibration.
- During the annual whelping season, mother mink were especially excitable and could kill their own kittens if frightened or disturbed.
- In early May 1951, Preston Mill Company conducted blasting about two miles away to build a logging road.
- Foster alleged that the noise and vibration from the blasting frightened the mother mink and caused them to kill a substantial number of kittens.
- Foster notified Preston Mill of the alleged problem, but blasting continued for a period of time.
- Foster sued asserting (1) strict liability for blasting and (2) alternatively, nuisance.
- After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for Foster for $1,953.68, reasoning that once Preston Mill had notice, it was absolutely liable for subsequent losses; the nuisance theory was rejected.
Issues
- Whether strict liability for blasting applies to consequential losses from mink killing their kittens due to fright, where the blasting caused no direct physical injury to persons or property.
- Whether the blasting constituted a private nuisance interfering with the mink ranch’s use and enjoyment of land.
Decision
- The Washington Supreme Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the action.
- The court held Preston Mill was not strictly liable because the harm was outside the class of risks that makes blasting subject to strict liability.
- The court held the blasting did not constitute a nuisance under the circumstances.
- The court rejected the view that notice could expand strict liability to cover harms beyond the doctrine’s limited scope.
Legal Principles
- Strict liability for ultrahazardous activities is confined to harms within the “abnormal danger” that justifies imposing liability without fault.
- For blasting, strict liability typically addresses direct, physically destructive risks (e.g., flying debris, impact damage), not highly unusual consequences dependent on unusual susceptibility.
- A defendant engaged in an ultrahazardous activity is not an insurer for injuries that occur only because the plaintiff’s use or property is abnormally sensitive.
- Notice that a plaintiff is experiencing an atypical, sensitivity-based injury does not, by itself, convert a non-compensable consequence into one covered by strict liability.
- Nuisance requires an unreasonable and substantial interference with use and enjoyment measured by ordinary standards; interference attributable chiefly to extraordinary sensitivity does not establish nuisance.
Conclusion
The court limited blasting strict liability to harms of the type that make blasting unusually dangerous and held that fright-induced mink losses during whelping, tied to an unusually sensitive enterprise rather than direct blasting hazards, were not compensable under strict liability or nuisance.