## Facts

- Martin Rene Frazier and his cousin, Jerry Lee Rawls, were jointly indicted in Oregon for murder; Rawls pleaded guilty, and Frazier was tried and convicted of second-degree murder.
- In opening statement, the prosecutor briefly summarized testimony he expected Rawls to give, based on information suggesting Rawls would testify despite indications he might invoke the Fifth Amendment.
- When called at trial, Rawls claimed the privilege against self-incrimination and gave no testimony; the court denied a mistrial request and instructed the jury that counsel’s openings are not evidence.
- After arrest, police warned Frazier he could have an attorney and that statements could be used against him.
- During interrogation, an officer falsely told Frazier that Rawls had already confessed.
- Frazier initially hesitated and stated he thought he “better get a lawyer before” talking further; the officer responded that Frazier “could not be in any more trouble than he was in,” and Frazier then made an oral confession and later signed a written confession after additional warnings.
- Police searched a duffel bag used jointly by Frazier and Rawls, relying on Rawls’s consent, and seized clothing admitted at trial.
- After state appellate review, Frazier sought federal habeas relief; the district court granted relief, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether the Confrontation Clause was violated when the prosecutor summarized expected testimony from a witness who later invoked the Fifth Amendment and did not testify.
2. Whether Frazier’s confession was obtained in violation of the right to counsel or was involuntary due to continued questioning after an equivocal reference to a lawyer and police deception.
3. Whether admission of evidence seized from a jointly used duffel bag violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when police relied on the co-user’s consent to search.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upholding Frazier’s conviction.
- The Court held that the prosecutor’s brief, objective opening summary of expected testimony, combined with the trial court’s instruction that openings are not evidence, did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
- The Court held there was no denial of the right to counsel under then-governing standards, that *Miranda* was inapplicable because it was not retroactive to Frazier’s trial, and that the confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances despite the false statement about Rawls’s confession.
- The Court held the duffel-bag search was valid because Rawls, as a joint user, consented to the search, making admission of the seized clothing constitutionally permissible.

## Legal Principles

- A prosecutor’s opening statement referencing expected testimony does not necessarily violate the Confrontation Clause when the witness later refuses to testify, especially where the reference is brief, not stressed as decisive, and the jury is instructed that openings are not evidence.
- Pre-*Miranda* right-to-counsel analysis may treat an equivocal remark about counsel, in context, as insufficient to require cessation of questioning absent a clearer request.
- *Miranda* does not apply retroactively to trials concluded before it was decided.
- Police deception during interrogation (including falsely claiming a confederate confessed) does not, by itself, render a confession involuntary; voluntariness is assessed under the totality of the circumstances.
- A person with joint use or joint control of property may consent to its search, and evidence obtained through such consent may be admitted against another joint user.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld the conviction, concluding that a limited opening summary of expected testimony from a non-testifying witness did not deny confrontation, that the confession was admissible under pre-*Miranda* standards and totality-of-circumstances voluntariness review despite deception, and that a co-user’s consent validated the search of jointly used effects.


Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969)