Facts
- Ronald L. Freedman operated a Baltimore theater and exhibited the film “Revenge at Daybreak” without first submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors as required by Md. Ann. Code art. 66A, § 2.
- Maryland’s statute made it unlawful to exhibit any motion picture unless it had been submitted to, approved by, and licensed by the Board.
- The State conceded the film was not obscene and would have been licensed if submitted, but prosecuted Freedman for exhibiting it without prior approval.
- Freedman argued the statutory scheme was unconstitutional on its face because it impaired freedom of expression.
- The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, treating prior submission requirements as constitutionally permissible.
- The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
Issues
- Whether a state may require prior submission of motion pictures to a censorship board consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
- Whether Maryland’s film-licensing scheme imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint because it lacked adequate procedural safeguards.
Decision
- The Court unanimously reversed and held Maryland’s censorship scheme unconstitutional.
- Prior submission of films is not categorically barred, but prior restraints carry a heavy presumption of invalidity.
- Maryland’s procedures posed an unacceptable risk of suppressing protected expression because they did not include safeguards necessary to limit administrative discretion and delay.
- Freedman could challenge the licensing scheme without first applying for a license.
- Because the statutory requirement of prior submission operated as an invalid prior restraint, Freedman’s conviction could not stand.
Legal Principles
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Prior restraints on expression are presumed unconstitutional; a prior-approval system must include procedures that prevent suppression of protected speech through discretion or delay.
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A prior-submission scheme is constitutionally permissible only if it includes, at minimum:
- The burden is on the censor to prove the expression is unprotected.
- Any restraint before judicial review is limited to a brief, fixed period necessary to preserve the status quo.
- The system assures a prompt and final judicial determination.
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A person subject to a licensing law affecting expression has standing to challenge it even without seeking a license, because the scheme itself may chill protected speech.
Conclusion
Maryland’s film-licensing statute was an unconstitutional prior restraint because it failed to place the burden on the censor, lacked strict limits on pre-review restraint, and did not assure a prompt final judicial decision, requiring reversal of the conviction for exhibiting a film without prior approval.