Facts
- Cynthia Frierson worked as the director of financial aid for the University of Chicago’s medical school beginning in December 2010.
- Frierson reported to Sylvia Roberson, a supervisor who later issued a negative performance assessment and recommended that Frierson be terminated.
- The University terminated Frierson’s employment in 2013 after Roberson’s negative review and recommendation.
- Frierson claimed Roberson’s assessment and recommendation were false and made for Roberson’s own benefit and with the single purpose of harming Frierson, but Frierson did not plead specific supporting facts showing personal animus, personal gain, or conduct outside Roberson’s managerial role.
- Frierson sued the University asserting tortious interference with prospective economic advantage (future financial benefit), seeking to hold the University liable on a respondeat superior theory for Roberson’s alleged conduct.
- After Frierson filed a second amended complaint, the University moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and Frierson appealed.
Issues
- Whether Frierson’s second amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.
- Whether the complaint satisfied the requirement that the interference be directed at an identifiable third-party business expectancy, given that an employer generally cannot interfere with its own employment relationship.
- Whether Frierson pleaded enough nonconclusory facts to bring the claim within the narrow exception that treats a corporate officer or supervisor as a “third party” when acting solely for personal reasons or solely to harm the employee, including facts sufficient to show malice or lack of justification.
Decision
- The appellate court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice.
- The court held that Frierson did not plead a reasonable expectancy of a valid business relationship with an identifiable third party; the allegations focused on internal employment actions leading to her discharge.
- The court held that Frierson’s assertions that Roberson acted for her own benefit and solely to hurt Frierson were conclusory and unsupported by specific factual allegations, so they did not plausibly place Roberson outside the University’s interests or her supervisory duties.
- Because the underlying tort was not adequately pleaded, Frierson could not impose vicarious liability on the University under respondeat superior.
Legal Principles
- Tortious interference with prospective economic advantage requires allegations of: (1) a reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that expectancy, (3) purposeful interference by the defendant that prevents the expectancy from ripening, and (4) resulting damages.
- The required “interference” generally must be aimed at a relationship between the plaintiff and an identifiable third party; an employer ordinarily cannot tortiously interfere with its own employment relationship with its employee.
- A supervisor or corporate officer may be treated as a third party only in a narrow situation where the plaintiff pleads facts showing the supervisor acted solely for personal interest or solely to harm the employee, rather than in furtherance of the employer’s business.
- Conclusory allegations of malice, self-interest, or improper motive—without concrete supporting facts—do not satisfy Illinois pleading standards for tortious interference.
- Respondeat superior does not supply missing elements of the underlying tort; if the complaint fails to state a tort claim, vicarious liability against the employer also fails.
Conclusion
The appellate court affirmed dismissal with prejudice because Frierson failed to plead a specific, third-party business expectancy and relied on unsupported, conclusory allegations that her supervisor acted solely out of personal benefit or spite; without a well-pleaded underlying tort, the University could not be held liable under respondeat superior.