## Facts

- E.F., a child with spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, attended an elementary school in Napoleon, Michigan and received an Individualized Education Program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), including a one-on-one aide.
- After a physician prescribed a trained service dog, Wonder, E.F.’s parents requested that Wonder accompany E.F. at school to assist with daily tasks and mobility-related needs.
- School officials refused, concluding the existing aide made the service dog unnecessary.
- The U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights found the refusal violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; the school later allowed E.F. to return with Wonder.
- E.F.’s parents instead enrolled her in another district that permitted Wonder and sued the original school district and officials under the ADA and § 504, seeking, among other relief, compensatory damages for emotional distress and loss of independence.
- The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust IDEA administrative procedures; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, treating the suit as effectively about educational services.

## Issues

1. Whether 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) requires exhaustion of IDEA administrative procedures before bringing ADA and § 504 claims when the complaint’s substance alleges disability discrimination rather than denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE).
2. How courts should determine whether the “gravamen” of a complaint seeks relief for denial of FAPE, triggering § 1415(l)’s exhaustion requirement.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and remanded.
- Exhaustion is not required when the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something other than denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee of FAPE.
- Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion only when the complaint, in substance, seeks relief for a school’s failure to provide FAPE, even if pleaded under the ADA or § 504.
- The Court directed lower courts to assess the complaint’s substance using practical indicators, including whether the same claim could be brought in a non-school public setting or by an adult in the school setting.
- The Court noted that a plaintiff’s prior pursuit of IDEA procedures may indicate the dispute is actually FAPE-centered, warranting further consideration on remand.

## Legal Principles

- IDEA exhaustion under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) is required only when a plaintiff seeks relief “also available” under the IDEA, meaning relief for denial of FAPE.
- Courts must look to the substance (gravamen) of the complaint, not the statutory label or whether the claim could have been framed under the IDEA.
- Two practical inquiries can help identify a non-FAPE discrimination claim: (1) whether essentially the same claim could be brought against a public facility that is not a school, and (2) whether an adult at the school could bring essentially the same grievance.
- Prior invocation of IDEA administrative processes can be evidence that the complaint is fundamentally about FAPE, even if later re-pleaded under the ADA or § 504.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 1415(l) does not impose IDEA exhaustion for ADA and § 504 suits alleging disability discrimination independent of FAPE, and it remanded for consideration of whether the dispute’s history showed the claims were, in substance, FAPE-based.


Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017)