## Facts

- John Francis Fry, a California state prisoner, was convicted by a third jury of the 1992 murders of James and Cynthia Bell after two prior mistrials.
- Fry’s defense theory was that another person, Anthony Hurtz, committed the murders.
- The trial court permitted multiple defense witnesses tying Hurtz to the crimes but excluded testimony from Pamela Maples, who would have recounted Hurtz’s statements about homicides resembling the Bells’ murders.
- The trial court excluded Maples’s testimony for lack of sufficient linkage between the incidents described and the charged murders.
- On direct appeal, Fry argued the exclusion denied him a fair opportunity to present a defense under due process principles associated with third-party guilt evidence.
- The state appellate court upheld the exclusion under state evidentiary rules and stated there was “no possible prejudice” because the testimony was “merely cumulative,” without clearly identifying a federal harmless-error standard.
- Fry sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the federal courts denied relief after applying Brecht’s harmless-error test and finding no substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

## Issues

1. In a federal habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, must a federal court evaluate the prejudicial impact of constitutional trial error under Brecht’s “substantial and injurious effect or influence” standard even when the state appellate court did not recognize the error and did not clearly apply Chapman’s “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief.
- In § 2254 proceedings, federal courts must apply Brecht’s “substantial and injurious effect or influence” standard to assess harmlessness of constitutional trial error, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error or conducted Chapman harmless-error review.
- The Court rejected the argument that the governing habeas harmless-error standard should depend on whether the state court performed Chapman analysis.
- The Court indicated (consistent with the State’s concession) that the State bears the burden of persuasion on harmlessness under Brecht.

## Legal Principles

- On direct review, constitutional trial error is harmless only if the State proves it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman).
- On federal habeas review of state convictions, the standard is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict (Brecht).
- Brecht applies categorically in § 2254 cases; the standard does not turn on whether the state appellate court recognized the federal error or applied Chapman.
- The rationale for a less demanding harmless-error standard on collateral review rests on finality, comity, and federalism, which apply regardless of the state court’s harmless-error discussion.
- AEDPA does not displace Brecht’s harmless-error framework on federal habeas review; habeas relief remains constrained even when state-court harmless-error analysis is absent or unclear.

## Conclusion

Federal habeas courts reviewing state convictions under § 2254 must assess harmlessness of constitutional trial error using Brecht’s “substantial and injurious effect or influence” test, even when the state appellate court did not recognize the constitutional error or conduct Chapman harmless-error review, and the judgment denying relief was affirmed.


Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007)