## Facts

- The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued an administrative complaint under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act against Standard Oil Company of California and others, stating it had “reason to believe” they used unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
- While the FTC matter was pending before an Administrative Law Judge, Standard Oil filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that the complaint was unlawful and an order requiring the FTC to withdraw it.
- Standard Oil alleged the FTC lacked the required “reason to believe,” and asserted the complaint was baseless, politically motivated, and issued after insufficient investigation.
- Standard Oil claimed the pending complaint caused substantial burdens, including defense costs and reputational harm.
- The district court dismissed, holding the complaint was not reviewable because it was not final agency action; the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, treating issuance of the complaint as final agency action and permitting inquiry into the “reason to believe” determination.

## Issues

1. Whether the FTC’s issuance of an administrative complaint under § 5 constitutes “final agency action” under APA § 10(c) and is immediately subject to judicial review.
2. Whether defense costs and alleged reputational injury from a pending administrative complaint make the complaint sufficiently final to permit pre-enforcement judicial review.
3. Whether an agency’s refusal to withdraw an administrative complaint confers finality for purposes of judicial review.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ordered dismissal of Standard Oil’s suit.
- The Court held that issuance of the FTC complaint was not “final agency action” under APA § 10(c).
- The complaint was treated as a step initiating adjudication, not a definitive determination that imposed binding legal consequences.
- The Court held that expense and disruption from defending an administrative enforcement proceeding, even if substantial, do not constitute irreparable injury that justifies immediate review.
- The Court stated that challenges to the lawfulness of issuing the complaint could be raised later in judicial review of any final FTC cease-and-desist order, assuming the matter is not committed to agency discretion by law.
- A concurrence would have held more narrowly that initiation of a complaint is not “agency action” within the APA’s definitions, reinforcing the lack of immediate reviewability.

## Legal Principles

- Judicial review under the APA generally requires “final agency action”; initiating an administrative enforcement proceeding is ordinarily nonfinal.
- An agency complaint that merely begins adjudication, and does not itself determine rights or obligations or impose direct legal consequences, is not a definitive agency position for finality purposes.
- Litigation burdens associated with defending an enforcement action (costs, disruption, and reputational effects) are ordinary incidents of the process and do not convert a nonfinal step into final agency action.
- Exhaustion-related steps, such as requesting withdrawal of a complaint and receiving a refusal, do not by themselves create finality.
- Alleged defects in the initiation of an administrative proceeding may be reviewable after the agency issues a final order subject to appellate review.

## Conclusion

The Court held that an FTC administrative complaint is a nonfinal step that initiates adjudication and therefore cannot be challenged in federal court before the agency completes its process; the regulated party must wait for review of any final agency order to contest the complaint’s issuance.


FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232 (1980)