## Facts

- Henry Furst filed civil claims arising from money he transferred to Alan Blackman in connection with MediBar Medical Industries, Inc.
- In an earlier amended pleading and sworn affidavit, Furst described the transaction as wiring money to purchase MediBar stock.
- In a later third amended complaint, Furst changed theories and alleged the transaction was an oral 90-to-120-day loan secured by MediBar stock and additional Blackman family assets, including a residence.
- Defendants sought to strike the third amended complaint as a sham pleading under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.150, relying on the inconsistency between the stock-purchase theory and the loan theory.
- The sham-pleading motion was not verified as required by Rule 1.150(b); the trial court denied the motion and contemplated that defendants would respond to subsequent pleadings.
- A different circuit judge later dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice on a motion to dismiss that reiterated the sham-pleading allegations and raised multiple jurisdictional and pleading defects; the dismissal order did not specify its grounds.
- On appeal, defendants primarily defended dismissal on two bases: sham pleading under Rule 1.150 and the court’s inherent authority to dismiss for fraud on the court.

## Issues

1. Whether dismissal with prejudice could be sustained on the ground that the third amended complaint was a sham pleading under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.150, given the lack of verification and a prior denial of sham-pleading relief.
2. Whether dismissal with prejudice could be sustained as an exercise of the court’s inherent power to dismiss an action for fraud on the court based on inconsistent sworn allegations.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the dismissal with prejudice and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the dismissal could not be upheld as a sham-pleading disposition because Rule 1.150 procedures were not satisfied and a prior judge had already denied sham-pleading relief.
- The court held the dismissal could not be upheld as a fraud-on-the-court sanction because the record and process did not meet the demanding standard for that extraordinary remedy, and the trial court’s order contained no findings or explanation supporting it.

## Legal Principles

- A sham-pleading motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.150 must be verified and requires an evidentiary showing at a hearing sufficient to prove falsity before a pleading may be stricken.
- Because sham-pleading relief terminates claims without trial, Rule 1.150 is strictly construed and applied sparingly.
- Inconsistencies between successive pleadings may bear on credibility and proof, but do not alone justify dismissal with prejudice absent compliance with governing procedures and a proper evidentiary basis.
- A successor judge generally should not grant the functional equivalent of previously denied sham-pleading relief on the same ground through a different procedural label without a proper procedural foundation.
- A court’s inherent power to dismiss for fraud on the court is limited and requires a clear showing of an unconscionable scheme to interfere with the judicial process, supported by appropriate procedure and findings commensurate with the severity of dismissal.

## Conclusion

The appellate court set aside a with-prejudice dismissal because the case had effectively been terminated on sham-pleading or fraud-on-the-court theories without the verification, hearing-based proof, and specific findings required for such extreme relief, leaving credibility disputes to ordinary litigation processes on remand.


Furst v. Blackman, 744 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)