## Facts

- Betsy H. Stevens owned a roughly 120-acre homestead property identified as Lot 58 on the Town of Belgrade property map.
- Albert R. Gagne (and his company, Gagne & Son Concrete Blocks, Inc.) previously bought a different parcel (Lot 52) from Stevens.
- On August 9, 1986, Gagne met with Stevens at her home; the parties disputed their discussion, but Stevens signed a brief handwritten writing.
- The writing described the subject as “a piece of lot # 58” of “approximate size of 30 ±” acres, “located at the boundaries” of Foster Point Road and Route 27, “also abutting” Lot 59B, with access “to meet my approval.”
- The writing stated Stevens accepted a $100 check as a down payment, with the balance due when the deed was completed; Stevens cashed the check.
- The writing was signed by Stevens and her husband, but not by Gagne.
- Gagne claimed the agreement entitled him to select 30 acres within a general area of Lot 58 and that Stevens authorized him to obtain a survey to create a deed description.
- Stevens characterized the writing as preliminary and contended no definite parcel within Lot 58 had been agreed upon.
- Gagne sued for specific performance; the trial court granted Stevens summary judgment, and Gagne appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the writing’s description of the land was sufficiently definite to satisfy Maine’s statute of frauds for contracts for the sale of land (33 M.R.S.A. § 51(4)).
2. Whether parol evidence could be used to identify the specific 30-acre parcel within Lot 58 that the writing did not precisely locate.
3. Whether promissory estoppel could support specific performance despite noncompliance with the statute of frauds and the writing’s indeterminacy.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed summary judgment for Stevens.
- The court held the writing failed the statute of frauds because it did not identify, with reasonable certainty, which 30-acre parcel within Lot 58 was to be conveyed.
- The court held parol evidence was inadmissible to supply the missing essential term (the parcel’s identity) when the writing itself did not sufficiently describe the land.
- The court held promissory estoppel did not justify ordering specific performance of an agreement that left the essential land description unresolved and lacked exceptional reliance.

## Legal Principles

- A contract for the sale of land must contain a written description that identifies the property with reasonable certainty, either on the face of the writing or by reference to objective data that permits location of the land.
- A description referring to an unspecified “piece” of a larger tract, coupled with approximate acreage and general boundary references, is insufficient when multiple configurations could satisfy the description and the specific parcel is left for future selection.
- Parol evidence may clarify an ambiguity in an otherwise adequate description, but it cannot supply an essential missing term such as which portion of a larger tract is being sold.
- Promissory estoppel is not a routine means to avoid the statute of frauds; specific performance is disfavored where essential terms—especially the land to be conveyed—remain indefinite and the reliance shown is not extraordinary.

## Conclusion

The court enforced the statute of frauds by refusing specific performance of a land-sale writing that did not identify a definite parcel within a larger lot, rejecting attempts to cure the defect through parol evidence or promissory estoppel.


Gagne v. Stevens, 696 A.2d 411 (Me. 1997)