## Facts

- Charles R. Myers was driving in Maryland near the District of Columbia line when a speeding car struck his vehicle from the rear and ultimately came to rest in a ditch.
- The striking car was abandoned before police arrived.
- The abandoned car’s District of Columbia license tags led police to trace ownership to Frederick O. Gaither.
- Myers sued Gaither and Gaither’s insurer in the District of Columbia.
- At trial, Gaither denied driving and presented an alibi supported by a witness (Hendricks); the trial court found no sufficient evidence that Gaither or any agent was driving and directed a verdict for Gaither.
- Myers also advanced a separate theory that Gaither negligently left the ignition keys in the unattended car in the District of Columbia, allegedly violating a District regulation intended to reduce unauthorized use and resulting harms.
- A local appellate court ordered a new trial, reasoning that a District financial responsibility statute supplied a presumption of consent/agency from proof of ownership; Gaither appealed further.

## Issues

1. Whether proof that an accident-involved vehicle is owned by the defendant permits a rebuttable evidentiary presumption that the vehicle was operated by the owner or the owner’s agent, and whether Gaither’s evidence conclusively rebutted that presumption so as to permit a directed verdict.
2. Whether leaving ignition keys in an unattended vehicle in violation of a District of Columbia safety regulation can support negligence liability and proximate cause for an accident occurring after an unauthorized person takes the vehicle and causes a collision.
3. Whether the new-trial order could be sustained without treating the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility Law as controlling for an accident occurring in Maryland.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the order granting a new trial.
- The court held that a common-law presumption of operation by the owner or the owner’s agent was available upon proof that the accident vehicle was traced to the defendant as owner.
- The court held Gaither’s rebuttal (including the alibi testimony) was not so uncontradicted and conclusive that the presumption disappeared as a matter of law; credibility and contradictions were for the jury.
- The court held Myers presented an independent theory of liability based on the alleged keys-left-in-car regulatory violation, including jury questions on negligence and proximate cause.
- The court affirmed the new-trial result while declining to rest the presumption on the financial responsibility statute as applied by the local appellate court.

## Legal Principles

- In District of Columbia courts, proof of vehicle ownership connected to an accident supports a rebuttable presumption that the vehicle was operated by the owner or an authorized agent.
- A directed verdict is improper where the defendant’s rebuttal to the ownership/agency presumption is not uncontradicted and conclusive; credibility disputes and internal inconsistencies are for the jury.
- Violation of a safety regulation requiring removal of ignition keys from an unattended vehicle may be evidence of negligence when the regulation is aimed at preventing unauthorized use and resulting injuries.
- Proximate cause and foreseeability may be found where the harm that occurred is among the risks the regulation sought to prevent, even if an intervening unauthorized driver directly caused the collision.

## Conclusion

The court required a new trial because Myers was entitled to a rebuttable common-law presumption that the owner or an authorized agent was driving the traced vehicle and because a separate keys-left-in-car regulatory-violation theory presented jury questions on negligence and proximate cause, making the directed verdict improper.


Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968)