## Facts

- Suzanne Brown suffered injuries in an automobile accident and retained counsel under a one-third contingent fee agreement; the first lawyer withdrew due to a conflict.
- Brown then hired and later discharged a second lawyer for inadequate communication.
- Brown retained Robert Truitt of Lyons & Truitt, who undertook representation on the same basic one-third contingent fee arrangement and performed substantial pretrial work over roughly two and one-half years.
- After Truitt’s judicial appointment, Brown discharged Lyons & Truitt and retained Michael J. Galanis under a new written contingent fee agreement providing 40% of the gross recovery (plus an additional 10% if appealed), without addressing payment to prior counsel.
- When transferring the file, Truitt informed Galanis that the case had been handled under a one-third contingent fee agreement.
- After Galanis took over, Brown obtained a favorable jury verdict of $250,000.
- Lyons & Truitt sought compensation for its prior work; negotiations with Brown and Galanis failed, and Lyons sued seeking a declaration of its fee entitlement under quantum meruit.
- The trial court ruled Lyons was entitled to the reasonable value of its services and held Galanis responsible for payment to avoid burdening Brown with multiple fees; the court of appeals affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether a contingent-fee lawyer discharged before the contingency occurs may recover in quantum meruit if the client later obtains a settlement or judgment.
2. How to measure the discharged lawyer’s recovery (hours worked versus a share tied to the lawyer’s contribution to the final outcome).
3. Whether, absent an express written agreement, the client or successor contingent-fee counsel must pay the discharged lawyer’s fee.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Indiana held that, absent an express written agreement providing otherwise, a contingent-fee lawyer discharged before the contingency may recover the value of services rendered if the client later obtains a settlement or award.
- The court held the proper measure is the proportion of the total contingent fee that reflects the discharged lawyer’s contribution to the ultimate result.
- The court held that a successor lawyer working under a contingent-fee agreement, who knew of the prior representation, must pay the predecessor’s fee out of the successor’s contingent fee.
- The court characterized these rules as defaults that may be changed by reasonable written fee arrangements.

## Legal Principles

- A discharged contingent-fee lawyer may obtain quantum meruit compensation upon a later recovery to prevent unjust enrichment.
- In successive-counsel contingent-fee cases, the discharged lawyer’s recovery is measured by proportional contribution to the final result, not solely by hours expended or a simple time-based allocation.
- When successor counsel accepts a contingent-fee representation with knowledge of prior counsel’s involvement, successor counsel bears responsibility for satisfying predecessor counsel’s quantum meruit fee from successor counsel’s fee.
- Default allocation rules apply only in the absence of express written fee agreements providing a different, reasonable allocation consistent with professional obligations.

## Conclusion

Indiana adopted default rules for fee disputes between successive contingent-fee lawyers: a discharged lawyer may recover in quantum meruit after a later recovery, the recovery is a share of the total contingent fee keyed to contribution to the outcome, and knowledgeable successor counsel must pay that amount from successor counsel’s fee to avoid burdening the client with duplicative contingent fees.


Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858 (Ind. 1999)