## Facts

- Donald Galloway, a blind District of Columbia resident and registered voter, reported for jury duty in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
- Court personnel informed him he could not serve solely because he was blind, pursuant to a policy excluding all blind persons from jury service.
- Galloway sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Galloway conceded blindness could matter in some trials (e.g., those centered on substantial visual or documentary evidence), but argued fitness should be determined case-by-case through ordinary jury-selection procedures.
- He asserted that accommodations could enable service in many cases, including use of audio description for visual information; he also pointed to the court’s practice of accommodating deaf jurors with interpreters.
- Defendants argued blind individuals are not “otherwise qualified” because they cannot perform essential juror functions, including evaluating demeanor and visual evidence.

## Issues

1. Whether a public court’s categorical exclusion of blind persons from jury service violates § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by excluding an otherwise qualified individual solely by reason of disability.
2. Whether the same categorical exclusion violates Title II of the ADA as disability-based exclusion from a public entity’s services, programs, or activities.
3. Whether the exclusionary policy is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a deprivation of federally secured rights under color of law.
4. Whether blind individuals can be “otherwise qualified” to serve as jurors with reasonable accommodations, requiring individualized assessment rather than a blanket rule.

## Decision

- The court granted Galloway’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendants’ cross-motion.
- The court held that jury service administered by the Superior Court is a covered “program or activity” and “service, program, or activity” under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA.
- The court ruled the blanket exclusion of blind persons was unlawful because it rested on generalized assumptions about blindness rather than individualized assessment.
- The court concluded that blind persons may be otherwise qualified to serve as jurors in many cases, with reasonable accommodations where appropriate.
- The court issued declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from barring blind persons from participation in the jury pool.

## Legal Principles

- A public entity may not exclude a qualified individual with a disability from participation in a covered program or activity solely because of the disability under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA.
- “Otherwise qualified” status requires assessment of whether the individual can perform essential functions with reasonable accommodations; categorical disqualification based on disability is impermissible when not grounded in individualized evaluation.
- Courts must consider reasonable accommodations that permit participation without relying on broad stereotypes about disability.
- Jury qualification determinations should ordinarily be made through case-specific evaluation (including voir dire) rather than across-the-board exclusions.
- When a policy implemented under color of law violates enforceable federal statutory rights, § 1983 may provide a remedial vehicle for relief.

## Conclusion

The district court held that the Superior Court’s categorical exclusion of blind persons from jury service violated the Rehabilitation Act and ADA because it denied access to a government program based on generalized assumptions rather than individualized qualification and reasonable accommodation, and it enjoined continued enforcement of the policy.


Galloway v. Superior Court of D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993)