Garcia v. Soogian, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 338 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1959)

Facts

  • A 12-year-old child trespassed onto defendants’ lot around 8 p.m., when it was getting dark, to play hide-and-seek with other children.
  • Defendants stored prefabricated building panels containing glass windows on the lot about 120–150 feet from the street.
  • The panels (about 200 pounds each) were stacked in firm, orderly piles approximately 24–30 inches high, about 8 feet long, and at least 4 feet wide.
  • While chasing a playmate, the child attempted to jump over a stack, failed to clear it, landed on top, and her foot broke through the glass, cutting her ankle.
  • There was testimony that at least some stacks were uncovered and that the windows were visible.
  • During working hours, defendants (working nearby) ordered children off the lot; in their absence, a nearby resident also ordered children away on defendants’ behalf.
  • After a court trial, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff; defendants appealed, arguing the evidence did not support liability.

Issues

  1. Whether the evidence supported imposing liability on landowners for injuries to a child trespasser under Restatement (First) of Torts § 339 governing artificial conditions dangerous to trespassing children.
  2. Whether securely stacked, visible prefabricated panels with glass windows constituted an artificial condition involving an “unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm” to a child of plaintiff’s age.
  3. Whether a child nearly 13 years old failed, because of youth, to discover the condition or realize the risk of injury from running and jumping onto or over the stacks.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment for plaintiff.
  • The court held the evidence did not establish the § 339 elements needed for liability to a child trespasser.
  • The stacked panels, as maintained, did not create an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm within § 339(b).
  • The danger from glass was open and apparent, and a child of plaintiff’s age should have appreciated the risk, defeating § 339(c).
  • The ordinary utility of storing building materials in a conventional manner outweighed the risk presented on these facts under § 339(d).
  • A land possessor’s liability to child trespassers for harm from artificial conditions requires proof of each element of Restatement (First) of Torts § 339, including:

    • likely child trespass (§ 339(a));
    • an artificial condition creating an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm (§ 339(b));
    • the child’s failure, due to youth, to discover or appreciate the risk (§ 339(c)); and
    • slight utility of maintaining the condition compared to the risk (§ 339(d)).
  • Ordinary construction materials stored securely in a customary manner do not become an “unreasonable risk” solely because children may misuse them while trespassing.

  • When the condition and its danger are visible and readily appreciable to a child of the plaintiff’s age, § 339(c) is not satisfied.

Conclusion

The court held that securely stacked, visible glass-window panels on a construction lot did not present the type of unreasonable, nonobvious danger required for liability to a trespassing child under Restatement § 339, and it reversed the judgment for the injured child.