## Facts

- A certified class of Black Chicago public-housing tenants and applicants sued the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) over racially discriminatory site-selection and tenant-assignment practices.
- In 1969, the court found CHA had intentionally maintained segregation and entered a remedial judgment requiring CHA to administer public housing to dismantle the segregated system.
- The 1969 judgment used a broad definition of “Dwelling Unit” and imposed locational quotas: for each unit made available in “Limited Areas” (areas with at least 30% nonwhite population), CHA was to make available three units in “General Areas” (areas with less than 30% nonwhite population).
- In the early 1990s, CHA received roughly $50 million in federal HOPE VI funds to address severely distressed public housing.
- The distressed developments targeted for HOPE VI work were located in Limited Areas, and CHA sought to use HOPE VI funds solely for demolition and rebuilding at those sites.
- CHA asked the district court to rule that HOPE VI redevelopment (including replacement units) was not governed by the 1969 judgment’s “Dwelling Unit” definition and locational quota requirements.

## Issues

1. Whether CHA could use HOPE VI funds exclusively for rebuilding in Limited Areas without complying with the 1969 judgment’s locational quotas.
2. Whether HOPE VI replacement or revitalization units were outside the 1969 judgment’s definition of “Dwelling Units” subject to the decree.

## Decision

- The court rejected CHA’s request for an exemption from the 1969 judgment for HOPE VI activity.
- The court held that HOPE VI units are “Dwelling Units” within the meaning of the 1969 judgment and therefore remain subject to its locational and desegregation requirements.
- The court concluded that CHA must structure HOPE VI redevelopment to further, not weaken, the ongoing desegregation remedy, including producing units consistent with the General-Area/Limited-Area ratio framework.

## Legal Principles

- A remedial decree addressing intentional segregation may apply to later-created housing programs when its operative terms (such as a unit-based definition) are drafted broadly.
- “Replacement” construction is not exempt from a desegregation decree when the decree covers any unit newly made available through the housing authority after the decree’s entry.
- Programmatic goals of urban renewal or distressed-housing revitalization do not justify actions that perpetuate racial concentration where a court order requires affirmative steps to dismantle segregation.
- Federal funding programs like HOPE VI may be implemented in a manner consistent with court-ordered desegregation obligations absent a clear statutory or regulatory conflict.

## Conclusion

The court held that CHA’s HOPE VI redevelopment remained governed by the 1969 desegregation judgment, requiring HOPE VI-related units to be planned and produced in a manner that complies with the decree’s locational quotas and advances the dismantling of segregated public housing patterns.


Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Ill. 1998)