## Facts

- A child was born in 1982.
- In 1982, the alleged father sued the mother under former Massachusetts paternity provisions seeking a declaration of nonpaternity.
- The 1982 case ended in an agreed judgment and stipulation that the alleged father was not the child’s father.
- The child was not a party to the 1982 case, was not represented by counsel, and had no guardian or next friend appointed.
- In 1990, the child brought a paternity action under G.L. c. 209C to establish the alleged father’s paternity.
- At trial, the judge admitted a letter written by the mother to the alleged father when the child was eight, over objections, for a non-hearsay purpose.
- The trial judge found the defendant to be the child’s father, entered judgment for the child, and awarded attorney’s fees.

## Issues

1. Whether the child’s c. 209C paternity action was barred by res judicata based on the 1982 agreed judgment and stipulation of nonpaternity between the mother and defendant.
2. Whether allowing the child’s action violated Massachusetts separation-of-powers principles or the federal Contract Clause by disturbing the prior settlement.
3. Whether equitable estoppel or laches barred the child’s claim due to the mother’s earlier settlement and the delay in filing.
4. Whether the mother’s letter was improperly admitted as hearsay or unfairly prejudicial.
5. Whether “sufficient evidence” of intercourse under G.L. c. 209C, § 17 requires clear and convincing proof.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment establishing paternity.
- Res judicata did not bar the child’s action because G.L. c. 209C, § 22(d) authorizes collateral attack on judgments entered under the repealed c. 273 scheme and, independently, the child was not bound by a proceeding to which she was not a party and in which she was unrepresented.
- The separation-of-powers argument was rejected as inapplicable to the child’s statutory paternity action.
- The Contract Clause argument failed because the child was not a party to the earlier settlement agreement.
- Estoppel did not apply because the child did not participate in, and was not legally represented in, the prior settlement.
- Laches did not bar the action because the defendant failed to show unreasonable delay sufficient to defeat the claim.
- The letter was properly admitted for a non-hearsay purpose; any error was harmless because it was cumulative and not relied on to find paternity.
- The court declined to impose a clear-and-convincing standard where the statute required only “sufficient evidence.”

## Legal Principles

- A child’s right to seek adjudication of paternity under G.L. c. 209C is independent of prior litigation or settlement between the parents under repealed paternity statutes.
- Under G.L. c. 209C, § 22(d), certain prior paternity-related judgments entered under repealed provisions may be collaterally attacked in a c. 209C proceeding.
- Claim preclusion generally does not bind a nonparty child who lacked representation and whose interests were not protected in the earlier proceeding.
- A settlement agreement between parents does not extinguish the child’s separate interests for Contract Clause purposes when the child was not a contracting party.
- Estoppel and laches are not established in a child’s paternity action absent participation by the child and a showing of unreasonable delay and prejudice.
- Evidence may be admitted for a non-hearsay purpose; admission is not reversible error where it is cumulative and not material to the factfinder’s decision.
- “Sufficient evidence” under G.L. c. 209C, § 17 does not, without express statutory direction, impose a clear-and-convincing evidentiary burden.

## Conclusion

The court upheld a paternity judgment in favor of a child who was not bound by an earlier agreed nonpaternity judgment between the mother and alleged father, rejecting preclusion, constitutional, and equitable defenses and declining to raise the statutory burden of proof beyond the ordinary civil standard.


G.E.B. v. S.R.W., 422 Mass. 158, 661 N.E.2d 646 (1996)