Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)

Facts

  • Alexis Geier was injured in a 1992 crash while driving a 1987 Honda Accord.
  • The vehicle had manual lap and shoulder belts, which Geier was wearing, but lacked an airbag or other passive restraint.
  • Geier and her parents sued the manufacturer under District of Columbia tort law, alleging negligent and defective design for failure to include a driver-side airbag.
  • The governing federal scheme was the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 (1984 version).
  • FMVSS 208 required passive restraints in some, but not all, 1987 model-year vehicles and allowed manufacturers a choice among different passive-restraint technologies.

Issues

  1. Whether the Safety Act’s express preemption clause expressly preempted a state common-law tort claim based on failure to install airbags.
  2. Whether the Safety Act’s savings clause prevents application of implied (conflict) preemption to state tort claims.
  3. Whether a “no airbag” tort claim conflicts with FMVSS 208’s objectives and is therefore preempted as an obstacle to federal purposes.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the manufacturer (5–4, Breyer, J.).
  • The Court held the Safety Act did not expressly preempt the lawsuit.
  • The Court held the savings clause did not foreclose implied conflict preemption.
  • The Court held this particular tort claim was conflict-preempted because it would obstruct FMVSS 208’s objectives of manufacturer choice, mixed restraint technologies, and phased implementation rather than a universal airbag requirement for 1987 vehicles.
  • An express preemption clause, even when paired with a savings clause preserving common-law liability, does not categorically bar implied conflict preemption.
  • The savings clause prevents treating federal compliance as automatic immunity from tort liability, but it does not preserve state claims that conflict with federal regulatory objectives.
  • State law is preempted when it stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the full purposes and objectives of federal law, including agency regulations implementing a statutory scheme.
  • When a federal safety standard deliberately permits a range of compliance options to advance a regulatory plan, a state tort rule that effectively eliminates those options can be conflict-preempted.

Conclusion

The Court held that although the Safety Act’s express preemption provision did not itself bar the common-law claim, the claim was impliedly preempted because imposing tort liability for failure to install an airbag in a 1987 vehicle would undermine FMVSS 208’s federally chosen strategy of a gradual, mixed-technology introduction of passive restraints.