## Facts

- Kenneth J. Geljack, Jr. was adjudged a habitual traffic offender in December 1992, and his driving privileges were suspended for ten years beginning in January 1993.
- In July 1994, Geljack rode as a passenger while his wife drove him, his wife, and their daughter to a doctor’s appointment.
- During the trip, Geljack noticed the vehicle’s brakes appeared to be failing.
- After arriving, Geljack’s wife and daughter went inside for the appointment while Geljack remained with the vehicle.
- Instead of arranging for the car to be towed, Geljack drove it to a nearby brake/repair shop.
- While Geljack was driving to the shop, the brakes failed completely and he ran a red light.
- An Elkhart police officer observed the traffic violation, stopped the vehicle, and discovered Geljack’s driving privileges were suspended.
- The State charged Geljack with operating a motor vehicle while his driving privileges were suspended.
- At trial, Geljack asserted the statutory emergency defense, contending he drove because it was necessary to protect his family from the danger posed by the failing brakes.
- The trial court instructed the jury, consistent with Indiana Code § 9-30-10-18, that the “extreme emergency” defense must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The jury convicted Geljack, and he appealed, arguing the statute unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.

## Issues

1. Whether Indiana Code § 9-30-10-18 is unconstitutional because it places on the defendant the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the statutory “extreme emergency” defense in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while driving privileges are suspended.
2. Whether the statutory “extreme emergency” defense negates an element of the offense (requiring the State to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt) or instead constitutes an affirmative defense that may be assigned to the defendant to prove.

## Decision

- The Indiana Court of Appeals held Indiana Code § 9-30-10-18 constitutional.
- The court concluded the statute’s emergency provision operates as an affirmative defense that excuses otherwise unlawful driving rather than negating an element of the offense.
- Because the State still must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while his privileges were suspended, requiring the defendant to prove the emergency defense by a preponderance does not violate due process.
- The court affirmed Geljack’s conviction.

## Legal Principles

- The State must prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
- A legislature may require a defendant to bear the burden of proof on an affirmative defense, so long as proving that defense is not tantamount to negating an element of the crime.
- A defense that justifies or excuses conduct that otherwise satisfies the offense’s elements may be treated as an affirmative defense, with the defendant required to establish it.
- Under Indiana Code § 9-30-10-18, in prosecutions for operating a motor vehicle while driving privileges are suspended, the “extreme emergency” defense (operation necessary to save life or limb in an extreme emergency) must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.

## Conclusion

Geljack’s challenge failed because the statutory “extreme emergency” defense does not alter or negate the elements of operating a motor vehicle while driving privileges are suspended; it provides a limited excuse for conduct that remains otherwise unlawful. Since the State retained the burden to prove the offense’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the legislature could constitutionally assign Geljack the burden to prove the emergency defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and the conviction was affirmed.


Geljack v. State, 671 N.E.2d 163 (1996)