## Facts

- Florida generally permitted felony prosecutions to begin by prosecutor’s information rather than grand jury indictment (except for capital offenses).
- Respondents were arrested in Dade County, Florida, without warrants for non-capital offenses and were charged by information.
- One respondent was denied bail; another could not post a $4,500 bond, and both remained jailed pretrial.
- Under Florida practice, filing an information foreclosed a preliminary hearing, and habeas relief for lack of probable cause was available only in exceptional circumstances.
- Respondents filed a federal class action on behalf of similarly situated detainees, alleging entitlement to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause for continued detention after warrantless arrest.
- The district court certified a class, found a constitutional violation, and issued an injunction requiring an initial appearance and a time-limited adversary probable-cause hearing with counsel and witness confrontation rights.
- The court of appeals largely affirmed the injunction’s core requirement and much of its detailed procedure, with modifications.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment) requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended pretrial restraint of liberty after a warrantless arrest when prosecution is initiated by information.
2. Whether the Constitution requires that probable-cause determination to occur through an adversary hearing with counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination.
3. Whether federal equitable relief was barred by abstention principles where the suit challenged pretrial detention procedures rather than seeking to halt state prosecutions.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following a warrantless arrest.
- The Court ruled that a prosecutor’s information, standing alone, is not a constitutionally sufficient substitute for a neutral judicial probable-cause determination.
- The Court rejected the requirement of a full adversary probable-cause hearing as ordered below; the determination may be made through informal, nonadversary procedures by a judicial officer.
- The Court held that this probable-cause determination is not a “critical stage” requiring appointed counsel.
- The Court distinguished abstention doctrines and permitted federal injunctive relief directed at collateral pretrial detention procedures.
- The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

## Legal Principles

- A person arrested without a warrant may not be subjected to extended pretrial detention unless a neutral judicial officer promptly determines that probable cause exists.
- The prosecutor’s assessment of probable cause in filing an information does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a neutral and detached determination.
- The Fourth Amendment probable-cause determination for continued detention may be nonadversary and based on informal procedures; it need not include confrontation, cross-examination, or other trial-like safeguards.
- The probable-cause determination is distinct from judicial review of the decision to prosecute; the Constitution does not require judicial oversight of the charging decision itself.
- Absence of a pretrial probable-cause determination does not, by itself, require vacating a subsequent conviction.
- Federal courts may grant prospective relief against unconstitutional pretrial detention procedures even when abstention would bar interference with state prosecutions “as such.”

## Conclusion

Gerstein required States to provide warrantless arrestees a prompt judicial probable-cause determination as a condition of continued pretrial detention, while permitting that determination to occur through nonadversary procedures and rejecting a constitutional mandate for a full adversary hearing or appointed counsel at that stage.


Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)