## Facts

- Martine Gibbons, a Texas resident, and Donna Brown, a Florida resident, were passengers in a vehicle driven by Clarence Brown near Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
- Donna Brown alleged Gibbons negligently gave directions that led the driver to enter a one-way road in the wrong direction, causing a head-on collision and injuries.
- In 1995, Gibbons filed a Florida personal-injury action in Duval County against Clarence Brown arising from the same Canadian accident.
- In 1997, Donna Brown sued Gibbons in Duval County, alleging Gibbons was subject to Florida personal jurisdiction because she had previously filed the 1995 Florida suit concerning the same accident.
- Gibbons moved to quash service and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; the trial court denied the motion, and Gibbons took an interlocutory appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether the complaint alleged ultimate facts bringing Gibbons within Florida’s long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, based only on her earlier Florida lawsuit arising from the same accident.
2. Whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Gibbons would satisfy due process minimum-contacts requirements and be consistent with fair play and substantial justice.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the order denying Gibbons’s motion and remanded with directions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- The court held the complaint satisfied neither the statutory requirements of § 48.193 nor constitutional due process.
- A single prior, concluded Florida lawsuit by a nonresident does not constitute “substantial and not isolated activity” supporting general jurisdiction in a later, separate action by a different plaintiff.
- Even if the prior suit were treated as a Florida contact, it did not establish purposeful availment sufficient to make it reasonable for Gibbons to anticipate being sued in Florida by a different party in a new action.

## Legal Principles

- Florida applies a two-step personal-jurisdiction analysis: (1) the plaintiff must plead a statutory basis under § 48.193; and (2) jurisdiction must also satisfy federal due process minimum-contacts standards.
- Florida’s long-arm statute is strictly construed; conclusory assertions of jurisdiction are insufficient without ultimate supporting facts.
- Filing a lawsuit in Florida constitutes submission to the court’s authority for that action and lawful orders concerning that action’s subject matter, but it is not indefinite consent to jurisdiction for later, independent suits by other parties.
- General jurisdiction under the “substantial and not isolated activity” provision requires more than a single, past lawsuit and requires continuous, systematic connections with Florida.
- Due process requires purposeful availment and contacts such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into the forum; a one-time, ended lawsuit tied to an out-of-state accident does not meet that standard.

## Conclusion

The court ordered dismissal because Florida could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely on her prior Florida lawsuit arising from the same accident, where the later suit was a separate action by a different plaintiff and the defendant lacked continuous Florida contacts and minimum contacts sufficient for due process.


Gibbons v. Brown, 716 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1998)