## Facts

- Suzanne Barkes (plaintiff) and Dr. Alvin Gilbert (defendant) began a relationship in January 1989 that continued until June 1994.
- Barkes alleged Gilbert proposed marriage in September 1990, she accepted in December 1990, and he gave her an engagement ring.
- Barkes asserted that, because of the expected marriage and at Gilbert’s insistence, she took early retirement in 1992.
- In January 1993, Barkes sold her house and later moved into Gilbert’s home.
- Barkes did not allege that the parties set a wedding date or that she incurred wedding-related expenses (such as deposits, attire, or venue costs).
- The relationship deteriorated; Barkes moved out in 1994.
- In June 1994, Barkes sued Gilbert in Jefferson Circuit Court for breach of promise to marry, seeking damages tied to her early retirement and the sale of her house.
- After Barkes’s deposition, Gilbert moved for summary judgment; the circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the action.
- The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the claim, while recognizing it lacked authority to depart from Kentucky Supreme Court precedent.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review.

## Issues

1. Whether breach of promise to marry remains a viable common-law cause of action in Kentucky.
2. If not, whether Barkes could recover on any alternate theory (such as contract, reliance-based recovery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress) on the facts shown.

## Decision

- The Kentucky Supreme Court held breach of promise to marry is not a viable cause of action in Kentucky and abolished it as an independent common-law claim.
- The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s summary judgment for Gilbert.
- The Court concluded Barkes could not recover on the record under alternate theories because the alleged agreement to marry lacked the definiteness required for contract-type recovery, and the facts did not satisfy the requirements for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- Justice Cooper dissented.

## Legal Principles

- A state supreme court may modify or eliminate common-law causes of action when their original justifications no longer fit present social and legal conditions.
- Intermediate appellate courts must follow controlling state supreme court precedent; only the state supreme court may change its own common-law rules.
- A statute of limitations referencing a common-law claim does not, by itself, prevent judicial reexamination or elimination of that claim.
- Breach of promise to marry is a historically “heart-balm” action—a tort/contract hybrid—that invites speculative damages and is closely tied to outdated social assumptions; Kentucky eliminated it as a standalone claim.
- The end of a romantic engagement does not bar all civil remedies, but any recovery must rest on established elements of ordinary doctrines (for example, sufficiently definite contract terms and clear assent, or the demanding standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
- Where the parties did not set a wedding date and the evidence does not show a final, definite commitment sufficient for enforcement, contract and reliance-based recovery for generalized life decisions (such as retirement or selling a home) is unavailable on that record.
- Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress; a broken engagement, without more, does not meet that threshold.

## Conclusion

Gilbert v. Barkes abolished Kentucky’s common-law claim for breach of promise to marry and restored summary judgment for the defendant because the engagement, as described, lacked the definiteness needed for contract-style enforcement and the facts did not satisfy the elements of any substitute tort theory.


Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772 (1999)