## Facts

- Jacqueline Storey, as personal representative of the Estate of Elisha Anderson, filed a quiet-title action concerning real property in Miami, Florida.
- Hawanda Gilbert was named as a defendant as the grantee under a quitclaim deed conveying the property to her.
- Storey first attempted substituted service by having a process server go to the home of Gilbert’s mother-in-law, Rosa Gilbert.
- Rosa refused service and told the process server that Hawanda Gilbert did not live at Rosa’s address; the server left without leaving the papers.
- Storey then served Gilbert by publication, which is permitted in Florida quiet-title actions; the published notice stated Gilbert had to serve and file written defenses on or before October 28, 2004.
- The next day, a different process server again went to Rosa’s home and again was told Gilbert did not live there; the server threw the papers into the house and left, and Rosa pushed the papers back out and shut the door.
- On October 14, 2004, Storey moved for a default. The clerk entered a default, and the trial court entered a final judgment quieting title in Storey’s favor the same day.
- Also on October 14, Gilbert’s counsel served by mail a notice of appearance and a motion to dismiss; those papers were filed with the clerk on October 15.
- On October 26, 2004, Gilbert moved to vacate the default and final judgment, arguing the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because service at Rosa’s home was not valid substituted service and Gilbert had not been properly served.
- At an evidentiary hearing, Rosa Gilbert was the only witness. She testified, without contradiction, that Hawanda Gilbert did not live at Rosa’s home (though she received some mail there).
- The trial court denied the motion to vacate, reasoning that Gilbert’s motion to dismiss was untimely.

## Issues

1. Did the trial court obtain personal jurisdiction over Gilbert through substituted service at her mother-in-law’s residence when unrefuted testimony showed it was not Gilbert’s usual place of abode?
2. Should a default and quiet-title default judgment be set aside when entered before the response deadline stated in the service-by-publication notice and when the default was based on an invalid substituted-service theory?

## Decision

- The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the order denying Gilbert’s motion to set aside the default and default judgment.
- The court held the default and default judgment should not have been entered because service at Rosa Gilbert’s home did not satisfy Florida’s substituted-service requirements where the home was not Hawanda Gilbert’s usual place of abode.
- The court directed the trial court to set aside the default and the default judgment.

## Legal Principles

- Substituted service under Florida law requires delivery at the defendant’s “usual place of abode” to a person residing there who is at least 15 years old and informed of the papers’ contents. See Fla. Stat. § 48.031.
- Receipt of some mail at an address does not, by itself, make that address the defendant’s usual place of abode for substituted service.
- A default and resulting judgment entered without valid service of process are improper because valid service is required for personal jurisdiction.
- When service is by publication and the notice states a date by which defenses must be served and filed, entry of default before that date is improper, especially where the default rests on a disputed and defective personal-service theory.

## Conclusion

Gilbert v. Storey requires that substituted service meet the statutory conditions for service at the defendant’s usual place of abode, and it confirms that a quiet-title default judgment cannot stand when the defendant was not properly served and default was entered before the publication notice’s response deadline.


Gilbert v. Storey, 920 So. 2d 1173 (2006)