## Facts

- Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn, a transgender woman, worked as an editor for the Georgia General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC) and was supervised by Sewell R. Brumby.
- Glenn was hired in 2005 while presenting as male and was later diagnosed with gender identity disorder and began transitioning from male to female.
- In 2006, Glenn came to work presenting as a woman; Brumby sent her home, calling the appearance inappropriate and describing it as unsettling and unnatural.
- In 2007, after Glenn indicated she was ready to proceed with her transition at work (including changing her name and presenting as a woman), Brumby terminated her employment.
- Brumby admitted the termination was because of Glenn’s gender transition, citing concerns about disruption, coworker discomfort, and possible objections to Glenn using the women’s restroom.
- Glenn sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging equal protection violations based on sex discrimination (gender nonconformity) and discrimination based on her medical condition.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Glenn on the sex-discrimination claim and to Brumby on the medical-condition claim; both sides appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether terminating a transgender public employee for gender nonconformity constitutes sex-based discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
2. If the termination is sex-based discrimination, whether it is justified under intermediate scrutiny by an important governmental objective substantially related to the action taken.
3. Whether the appellate court must address the employee’s alternative medical-condition equal protection theory after affirming judgment on the sex-discrimination theory.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Glenn on her equal protection sex-discrimination claim.
- The court held that discrimination against a transgender person for gender nonconformity is sex discrimination for equal protection purposes.
- Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded Brumby’s asserted reasons—anticipated disruption, coworker discomfort, and restroom-related objections—did not amount to an important governmental objective and were not an adequate justification.
- Because affirmance on the sex-discrimination claim afforded Glenn the relief sought, the court did not reach her cross-appeal regarding the medical-condition claim.

## Legal Principles

- Government action that penalizes an individual for failing to conform to gender stereotypes constitutes sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.
- Sex-based classifications by the state are subject to intermediate scrutiny: the state must show an important governmental objective, and the challenged action must be substantially related to achieving that objective.
- Speculative workplace disruption or third-party discomfort—especially when rooted in gender stereotypes—cannot supply an important governmental objective sufficient to justify sex-based discrimination.
- The Equal Protection Clause forbids state action reflecting arbitrary classifications or a bare desire to harm an unpopular group.

## Conclusion

The court held that a public employer violates equal protection when it fires a transgender employee for gender nonconformity, and that such sex-based discrimination cannot be justified by generalized concerns about discomfort or speculative disruption under intermediate scrutiny.


Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011)