## Facts

- After Hugo Chávez’s 1998 election and during Venezuela’s constitutional transition, the National Constituent Assembly adopted transitional measures aimed at reorganizing the judiciary in response to allegations of corruption and dysfunction.
- A Judicial Emergency Commission was created and, together with related judicial authorities, implemented precautionary measures affecting judges, including suspensions tied to disciplinary complaints.
- On October 7, 1999, transitional instruments were issued in connection with a decree ordering reorganization of the Judicial Branch and the penitentiary system, and a related resolution provided for precautionary suspension in disciplinary matters (including a rule tied to the number of complaints).
- Gloria González Montero, a career judge with long tenure, alleged that these measures were applied to her through a suspension/notification without a regular disciplinary proceeding that guaranteed notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a reasoned decision by a competent authority.
- On November 9, 1999, González Montero filed an action seeking constitutional amparo together with annulment for unconstitutionality and illegality, directed at the emergency instruments and their application to her.
- The case was initially processed in the Supreme Tribunal’s Plenary Chamber (Sala Plena). On May 2, 2000, Sala Plena declined competence and sent the matter to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) for decision under the review posture reflected in the docket (Exped. No. 1142).

## Issues

1. Whether the Constitutional Chamber had competence to decide an amparo filed together with an action for annulment challenging emergency judicial-reorganization instruments and their application to an individual judge.
2. Whether transitional measures issued under the Constituent Assembly’s reorganization program could be reviewed for constitutionality and legality, and if so, what limits applied.
3. Whether an automatic or broadly applied precautionary suspension of a judge—triggered by complaint counts and implemented without a regular disciplinary procedure—violated constitutional guarantees of due process, defense, and judicial independence.
4. What relief was appropriate: total nullification of the emergency framework, or narrower relief requiring constitutionally adequate procedures and individualized justification.

## Decision

- The Constitutional Chamber accepted the referral from Sala Plena and proceeded to decide the matter within its constitutional jurisdiction over amparo and constitutional review.
- The court treated the Constituent Assembly’s transitional project for judicial reorganization as a politically and legally exceptional context, but not as a context that displaced constitutional rights protections in concrete cases.
- The court declined to invalidate the entire emergency reorganization scheme as such, recognizing that transitional authorities could adopt measures to address judicial corruption and institutional breakdown during the change in constitutional order.
- At the same time, the court held that precautionary measures against judges—especially suspensions affecting the exercise of judicial office—must be compatible with constitutional guarantees and cannot operate as a purely automatic consequence of the number of complaints.
- The court required that any suspension affecting a judge be tied to a procedurally regular disciplinary process that provides, at minimum, notice of the grounds, an opportunity to respond, and a reasoned decision issued by a competent authority.
- The court’s disposition provided relief consistent with those limits, favoring individualized control and due process protections over blanket or mechanical application of emergency criteria.

## Legal Principles

- Transitional or constituent-driven reorganization measures may receive deference as part of a constitutional transition, but they remain subject to constitutional control when they produce concrete effects on individual rights.
- The availability of amparo is not suspended during constitutional transition; it remains a vehicle to contest rights violations arising from the implementation of emergency measures.
- Disciplinary action and precautionary suspension of judges implicate judicial independence and therefore require heightened procedural safeguards, including notice, the right to defense, and individualized justification.
- A distinction exists between (a) high-level transitional choices about institutional design and (b) implementing acts that affect identified persons; the latter are more readily reviewable for legality, competence, and due process.
- Precautionary measures in disciplinary contexts must be reasoned and connected to a specific proceeding; a complaint-count threshold, standing alone, is not sufficient to displace due process guarantees.

## Conclusion

In Exped. No. 1142, the Supreme Tribunal’s Constitutional Chamber reviewed emergency judicial-reorganization measures linked to the Constituent Assembly and the Judicial Emergency Commission and refused to strike down the transition framework wholesale, but it limited how suspensions could be imposed by requiring constitutionally adequate, individualized disciplinary procedures that protect due process and judicial independence.


Gloria González Montero v. Asamblea Nacional Constituyente y Comisión de Emergencia Judicial, Amparo Constitucional en Revisión Exped. No. 1142 (2000)