## Facts

- Paul L. Glover, a union officer and lawyer, was convicted in federal court of labor racketeering-related offenses, money laundering, and tax evasion.
- At sentencing, the probation office recommended grouping the offenses under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3D1.2, which can reduce the combined offense level for counts involving substantially the same harm.
- The Government objected to grouping the money-laundering counts with the other counts, and the district court accepted the objection.
- The resulting calculation raised Glover’s offense level by two levels, increasing the advisory Guidelines range by approximately 6 to 21 months.
- Defense counsel did not meaningfully pursue the grouping argument at sentencing and did not raise it on direct appeal.
- Glover sought postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to litigate the grouping issue and asserting the failure increased his sentence.

## Issues

1. Whether a court may deny an ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland v. Washington because the sentence increase caused by counsel’s alleged error is not sufficiently “significant.”
2. Whether an increase in imprisonment of 6 to 21 months, if attributable to deficient performance, can satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court held that Strickland’s prejudice inquiry does not permit a categorical “significance” threshold for sentence increases.
- The Court ruled that any additional actual jail time resulting from counsel’s deficient performance can constitute prejudice.
- The case was remanded for application of the ordinary Strickland framework, including determinations of deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a lower sentence absent the alleged error.

## Legal Principles

- Strickland prejudice requires a reasonable probability of a different result; courts may not add a separate requirement that the difference be “significant.”
- Lockhart v. Fretwell does not replace Strickland’s prejudice standard and does not justify denying relief solely because the sentence increase is below a court-created magnitude threshold.
- Any amount of additional incarceration may have Sixth Amendment significance for ineffective-assistance prejudice analysis.
- The size of a potential sentence increase may be relevant to whether an attorney’s failure likely affected the outcome, but it cannot operate as an absolute bar to showing prejudice.
- In Guidelines-based sentencing, errors that raise the offense level and increase the imprisonment range can support Strickland prejudice if linked to counsel’s deficient performance.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule requiring a “significant” sentencing increase to prove Strickland prejudice, holding that any added prison time attributable to ineffective assistance may satisfy the prejudice prong and requiring lower courts to apply Strickland without a minimum-threshold screen.


Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001)