## Facts

- Plaintiffs rented from Carrie J. Wells and later entered a written agreement with her on February 21, 1936.
- The agreement required the parties to live together in Wells’s homestead for the rest of her life; Wells would occupy a specified room.
- Plaintiffs promised to provide Wells board, heat, light, laundry, and limited care for minor ailments not requiring a nurse or hospital service, and to pay $10 monthly rent; their household was limited to themselves and their daughter.
- Wells promised to leave the property to plaintiffs by will; she executed a will consistent with the agreement.
- Plaintiffs moved into the homestead and performed until about August 5, 1941, when they moved out and stopped performing.
- Evidence supported that relations were harmonious for about two years, then deteriorated; Wells frequently complained and imposed restrictions (e.g., objections to guests, not being left alone at night, criticism of housekeeping and cooking, demands for different food).
- Plaintiffs claimed Wells’s behavior made living together difficult; they proposed modifying the arrangement to separate responsibilities and pay higher rent, but Wells refused.
- After plaintiffs left, Wells revoked her will; she died May 21, 1942.
- Plaintiffs sued the executors for contract damages and, alternatively, in quantum meruit; a jury verdict for plaintiffs rested on breach of the express agreement.

## Issues

1. Whether Wells’s conduct constituted wrongful prevention of performance, excusing plaintiffs’ cessation of performance before her death and allowing recovery for breach of the express contract.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the executors’ motion to set aside the verdict on the express-contract count.

## Decision

- The appellate court found error in denying the motion to set aside the verdict on the express-contract count and ordered a new trial.
- The evidence, viewed most favorably to plaintiffs, did not show conduct by Wells that was wrongful and beyond her legal rights.
- Because plaintiffs left and ceased performance without legal excuse, they could not recover damages for breach of the express contract (including the value of the promised devise).

## Legal Principles

- Prevention of performance supports a breach action only when the alleged preventing conduct is wrongful and exceeds the actor’s legal rights.
- A bilateral contract with mutual, dependent covenants requires each party to remain ready and willing to perform as a condition to obtaining judicial relief, unless excused by the other party’s wrongful conduct.
- In a lifetime cohabitation and care arrangement, significant friction and disagreeable behavior, without a wrongful infringement of legal rights or contractual duties, does not constitute legal prevention excusing nonperformance.

## Conclusion

The court held that the decedent’s objectionable behavior did not amount to wrongful prevention of performance; plaintiffs who voluntarily abandoned a lifetime care-for-devise agreement before the decedent’s death were not entitled to recover on the express contract, requiring a new trial after the verdict was set aside.


Godburn v. Meserve, 37 A.2d 235 (Conn. 1944)