## Facts

- Luis Alexander Duenas-Alvarez, a lawful permanent resident and Peruvian citizen, was convicted under Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a) for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, which also covers being a party, accessory, or accomplice.
- Federal authorities initiated removal proceedings, alleging the conviction was an aggravated felony under the INA because it was a “theft offense” with at least a one-year term of imprisonment.
- An Immigration Judge found Duenas-Alvarez removable as an aggravated felon, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.
- The Ninth Circuit remanded, relying on its view that “aiding and abetting” fell outside the generic definition of a “theft offense” for INA purposes.
- The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the INA’s generic “theft offense” includes aiding and abetting.

## Issues

1. Whether “a theft offense” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) includes aiding and abetting a theft offense.
2. Under the categorical approach, what showing is required to establish that a state statute is broader than the generic federal definition of theft due to an assertedly atypical accomplice-liability theory.

## Decision

- The Court held that “theft offense” in § 1101(a)(43)(G) includes aiding and abetting a theft offense.
- The Court applied the categorical approach and concluded that generic theft, as used in most jurisdictions, includes both principals and aiders and abettors.
- The Court rejected the claim that California’s accomplice liability made § 10851(a) broader absent proof that California actually applies the statute to nongeneric conduct.
- The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
- The judgment was unanimous; Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part regarding aspects of the categorical-approach analysis.

## Legal Principles

- When a federal statute uses a generic offense term, courts generally apply the categorical approach, comparing the elements of the state offense to the generic definition rather than the case-specific facts.
- The generic definition of theft includes taking or exercising control over property without consent, with intent to deprive the owner of ownership benefits, even if deprivation is not total or permanent.
- Because modern state and federal law generally treats principals and accomplices alike, the generic offense term “theft” includes aiding and abetting theft.
- A party asserting that a state statute is broader than the generic offense must show a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the state applies the statute to conduct outside the generic definition, typically by identifying actual state cases (including the litigant’s own) reflecting that application.
- Arguments not properly presented as part of the question under review may be declined.

## Conclusion

The Court ruled that aiding and abetting falls within the INA aggravated-felony category for a “theft offense” and required a concrete, case-based showing to establish that a state statute reaches nongeneric conduct under the categorical approach.


Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007)