## Facts

- Warren Goodman, a Wisconsin prisoner, was convicted of armed robbery and felon in possession of a firearm arising from a 1992 armed robbery of a Milwaukee grocery store.
- The prosecution relied heavily on accomplice testimony obtained through cooperation agreements and on eyewitness identification evidence that had been inconsistent in earlier procedures.
- At an initial lineup, the store manager identified someone other than Goodman; in a later lineup, he identified Goodman. The cashier did not identify Goodman and previously testified she was unsure of the robber’s identity.
- Goodman’s first trial ended in a hung jury after the jury heard the cashier’s uncertainty along with the manager’s and an accomplice’s identification testimony.
- At the second trial, multiple accomplices and the manager identified Goodman; defense counsel failed to ensure the jury heard the cashier’s prior exculpatory testimony by not subpoenaing her and failing to lay a foundation to admit her prior testimony.
- Defense counsel also: (1) opened the door to highly prejudicial evidence of two prior armed robberies; (2) permitted unsupported insinuations that Goodman threatened witnesses; (3) failed to preserve confrontation-related objections; and (4) failed to object to prosecutorial misstatements bolstering accomplice credibility.
- The jury convicted Goodman, and he received a 22-year sentence.
- State postconviction relief was denied; the state appellate court assessed prejudice by asking whether counsel’s errors made the trial “fundamentally unfair” and evaluated alleged errors separately.
- Federal district court denied Goodman’s § 2254 petition under AEDPA; Goodman appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the state appellate court’s ineffective-assistance decision was “contrary to” clearly established federal law because it required Goodman to show his trial was “fundamentally unfair” rather than applying Strickland’s “reasonable probability” prejudice standard.
2. Whether the state court unreasonably applied Strickland by failing to consider the cumulative prejudicial effect of multiple attorney errors, warranting habeas relief under AEDPA.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
- The court held the state appellate court’s analysis was “contrary to” Strickland because it imposed a “fundamental fairness” prejudice test rather than asking whether there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
- The court also held the state court unreasonably applied Strickland by failing to account for cumulative prejudice from multiple serious defense-counsel errors in a credibility-driven case.
- The case was remanded with instructions to enter an order granting the writ of habeas corpus.

## Legal Principles

- Under AEDPA, habeas relief may be granted when a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent, including when it applies a prejudice standard more demanding than Strickland’s “reasonable probability” test.
- Strickland prejudice is assessed by asking whether counsel’s deficient performance creates a reasonable probability of a different result, undermining confidence in the verdict.
- In ineffective-assistance analysis, multiple deficiencies may be cumulatively prejudicial even if no single error would justify relief in isolation; failure to assess aggregate prejudice can constitute an unreasonable application of Strickland under AEDPA.
- When the prosecution case depends substantially on accomplice credibility and contested identification evidence, failures that (1) exclude key exculpatory eyewitness testimony, (2) admit highly prejudicial propensity evidence, and (3) leave false bolstering or intimidation insinuations uncorrected may collectively satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit granted federal habeas relief because the state court applied a prejudice standard inconsistent with Strickland and unreasonably failed to consider how counsel’s multiple errors—viewed together—created a reasonable probability of a different verdict in a close, credibility-dependent case.


Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2006)