## Facts

- Black employees sued their employer, Lukens Steel Company, and their collective-bargaining representatives (the Steelworkers and local unions) for race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- The collective-bargaining agreement included a nondiscrimination clause binding both the employer and the unions.
- The employees alleged the unions failed to challenge discriminatory discharges of Black probationary employees, refused to pursue grievances alleging racial discrimination, and tolerated racial harassment.
- The district court found the unions did not display overt racial animus, but did deliberately ignore or soft-pedal race-based grievances and failed to challenge known discriminatory practices (including segregated locker facilities and testing with racially disparate impact).
- The unions asserted they avoided raising discrimination grievances to prevent antagonizing management and to prioritize other grievances and reduce backlog.

## Issues

1. What Pennsylvania statute of limitations applies to employment-discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and may that limitations rule be applied retroactively to a suit filed before the rule was clearly established?
2. Whether unions violate Title VII and § 1981 by deliberately refusing to process or seriously pursue race-discrimination grievances and by tolerating known racial harassment, even absent proof of overt racial animus.

## Decision

- The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
- Pennsylvania’s two-year personal-injury statute of limitations governs § 1981 claims, and the rule applied retroactively to the plaintiffs’ action.
- The unions were liable under both Title VII and § 1981 for intentionally discriminating by refusing to process race-based grievances and by tolerating racial harassment.

## Legal Principles

- For § 1981 claims, the most analogous state limitations period is generally the state personal-injury statute of limitations, rather than a contract limitations period.
- A new limitations rule may be applied retroactively when there was no clear, authoritative precedent on which plaintiffs reasonably relied and retroactivity does not frustrate federal law or produce substantial inequity.
- § 1981 requires intentional racial discrimination; intentional discrimination can be shown by a deliberate pattern of treating race-based complaints differently, including refusing to invoke contractual grievance procedures to address known discrimination.
- Title VII prohibits union discrimination in representation and prohibits unions from causing or attempting to cause employer discrimination; deliberate inaction in the face of known employer discrimination and racial harassment can constitute actionable discrimination.
- A union may prioritize grievances for legitimate reasons, but it may not systematically deprioritize or ignore grievances because they allege racial discrimination.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 1981 employment-discrimination claims in Pennsylvania are governed by the state two-year personal-injury limitations period applied retroactively, and that unions commit intentional discrimination under § 1981 and Title VII when they deliberately refuse to pursue race-based grievances and tolerate known racial harassment.


Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)