## Facts

- Thomas Gore and Wanda Copeland rented an apartment in Bridgeport, Connecticut, owned by People’s Savings Bank and M.S.B. Real Estate Corporation, where their minor son lived.
- A city health department inspection found lead-based paint in excess of standards incorporated into Connecticut law.
- The inspector notified the landlord and requested abatement.
- A later reinspection reported that the lead hazards had been abated.
- The parents sued on their son’s behalf, alleging injuries from lead exposure and asserting negligence (including statutory violations), breach of lease provisions requiring legal compliance, and strict liability based on the lead-paint statutes.
- During the appeal, the legislature repealed Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-8, raising a dispute about whether the repeal affected interpretation of the prior statutory scheme.

## Issues

1. Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 47a-7, 47a-8, and 47a-54f(b) impose strict liability on residential landlords for a minor tenant’s injuries allegedly caused by lead-based paint.
2. Whether statutory violations constitute negligence per se and, if so, whether that doctrine removes common-law requirements such as landlord control and actual or constructive notice with a reasonable opportunity to repair.
3. Whether the repeal of § 47a-8 affects liability or shows prior legislative intent regarding strict liability.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court and rejected strict liability under the cited statutes.
- The Court held that violations of §§ 47a-8 and 47a-54f can constitute negligence per se, but negligence per se does not eliminate the plaintiff’s burden to prove traditional landlord-premises elements, including landlord control and notice (actual or constructive) plus a reasonable opportunity to remedy.
- The Court held the repeal of § 47a-8 did not affect the defendants’ liability in the pending case and did not control interpretation because the repeal history was ambiguous.
- The case was remanded to the Appellate Court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.

## Legal Principles

- Statutory housing and lead-paint standards may supply the applicable standard of care and support negligence per se, but do not create strict liability absent clear legislative intent.
- Negligence per se establishes duty and breach by reference to statute, but does not dispense with other elements of a landlord-tenant injury claim, including landlord control and actual or constructive notice with time to cure.
- A statutory scheme that uses inspection, notice, and abatement mechanisms is generally inconsistent with imposing immediate, no-fault liability on landlords.
- Post-enactment repeal of a statute does not alter pending liability or conclusively determine original legislative intent when the repeal history is unclear.

## Conclusion

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that lead-paint habitability statutes do not impose strict liability on landlords for tenant injuries, and that while statutory violations may constitute negligence per se, plaintiffs must still prove common-law premises-liability requirements such as landlord control and notice with a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition.


Gore v. People’s Sav. Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995)