## Facts

- Hafis Salich, a civilian investigator for the Office of Naval Intelligence in San Pedro, California, had access to Naval Intelligence files.
- Salich provided Mihail Gorin, found to be an agent of the USSR, with the contents of more than fifty Naval Intelligence reports in exchange for substantial payment.
- The reports primarily concerned Japanese activities in the United States, including movements of officials and suspected espionage activity near U.S. naval vessels.
- A federal grand jury charged Gorin and Salich with (1) obtaining documents connected with national defense, (2) delivering or inducing delivery of such documents to an agent of a foreign nation, and (3) conspiracy to deliver the documents to a foreign government and its agent.
- Gorin’s wife was tried as a co-defendant and acquitted; Gorin and Salich were convicted on all counts and received concurrent prison terms and fines.
- The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted review to address the statute’s scope and constitutionality as applied.

## Issues

1. Whether the Espionage Act provisions covering documents “connected with the national defense” are limited to the specific “places and things” enumerated elsewhere in the Act.
2. Whether construing “national defense” broadly makes the Act unconstitutionally vague under due process.
3. Whether the government must prove both intended “injury to the United States” and intended “advantage to a foreign nation,” or whether proving either is sufficient.
4. Whether the determination that information is “connected with the national defense” is for the judge as a matter of law or for the jury as a matter of fact under proper instructions.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
- The Court held that the relevant provisions are not confined to documents about the specifically listed military places or items; they also reach other information “connected with” national defense.
- The Court construed “national defense” to refer to military and naval establishments and related activities of national preparedness for war.
- With scienter and bad-faith requirements (intent or reason to believe the information will be used to injure the United States or advantage a foreign nation), the statute was sufficiently definite to satisfy due process.
- The government need not prove both injury to the United States and advantage to a foreign nation; proof of either satisfies the disjunctive statutory standard.
- The court must define the kind of information covered by the statute, but the jury decides whether the particular information obtained and transmitted fits that definition.
- The Naval Intelligence reports were capable of use to injure the United States or advantage a foreign nation, and the evidence supported the verdicts.

## Legal Principles

- Espionage Act prohibitions on obtaining or delivering information “connected with the national defense” are not limited to materials about the enumerated military facilities or items listed elsewhere in the statute.
- “National defense” includes military or naval establishments and activities related to national preparedness for war.
- A scienter requirement—intent or reason to believe disclosure will injure the United States or advantage a foreign nation—supports the statute’s definiteness against vagueness challenges.
- The statutory phrase “to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation” is disjunctive; proving one alternative suffices.
- In prosecutions under these provisions, the judge instructs on the statutory category of covered information, and the jury determines whether the information at issue is connected with national defense under those instructions.

## Conclusion

The Court sustained Espionage Act convictions for paid transmission of Naval Intelligence report contents to a foreign agent, holding that “national defense” extends to preparedness-related intelligence information, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague given its scienter requirement, proof of either injury or foreign advantage is sufficient, and juries decide whether the specific information falls within the statute as defined by the court.


Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941)