## Facts

- Louis Scuito, a frequent patron of a St. Thomas restaurant, drove a waitress home after work on July 9, 1978.
- The parties agreed they drove down a beach road, had sexual intercourse, and Scuito then drove her home; the dispute was whether the intercourse was consensual.
- The complainant testified Scuito threatened her with a knife (or a metal object held to her neck) and that she stopped resisting after the threat; medical evidence supported a cut on her neck.
- Scuito testified the encounter was consensual, that they went to the beach road to smoke marijuana, and that the complainant seemed “spaced out.”
- At the first trial, despite a prior understanding not to reference an alleged prior sexual assault, the prosecutor asked questions indirectly alluding to that incident; on Scuito’s motion, the court declared a mistrial.
- Before the second trial, Scuito moved for a psychiatric examination of the complainant, supported by counsel’s affidavit asserting extreme fantasizing, drug use, and unusual demeanor; the trial court denied the motion.
- A jury convicted Scuito of forcible rape, and he appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial after a mistrial granted on the defendant’s motion based on the prosecutor’s prejudicial questioning.
2. Whether the trial court abused or failed to exercise discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to compel a psychiatric examination of the complainant where credibility was central.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction.
- Retrial was not barred because the mistrial was granted on the defendant’s motion and the record did not show prosecutorial intent to provoke the motion.
- The denial of a compelled psychiatric examination was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion given the speculative showing and the privacy interests of sexual-assault complainants.

## Legal Principles

- When a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial, retrial is generally permitted unless prosecutorial misconduct was intended to provoke (goad) the defendant into seeking a mistrial.
- Ordering a psychiatric examination of a sexual-assault complainant is committed to the trial court’s discretion; appellate reversal requires a clear abuse of discretion or failure to exercise discretion.
- A defendant seeking a compelled psychiatric examination must present a concrete, non-speculative basis that the examination is necessary; the mere centrality of credibility is insufficient.
- Policies reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 412 (rape-shield protection against degrading exposure of intimate private matters) may inform a court’s decision whether to permit invasive credibility attacks, including compelled psychiatric examinations.

## Conclusion

The court held that double jeopardy did not prevent a second trial after a defendant-requested mistrial absent proof the prosecutor intended to trigger that mistrial, and it upheld the trial judge’s discretionary refusal to compel a psychiatric examination of the complainant based on a speculative proffer and strong privacy concerns reflected in rape-shield policy.


Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1980)