## Facts

- At night, a car driven by Rafael Franco and carrying his wife was struck from the rear by a truck owned by Bill Graham and driven by Graham’s employee.
- The Francos testified they were driving with lights on and that the car’s rear lights had recently been checked; the truck driver testified the Franco car was stopped on the highway with its lights off.
- The jury found the truck driver negligent for failing to keep a proper lookout and found Mr. Franco negligent for stopping on the highway and for having the car on the highway without a rear light burning; each negligent act was found a proximate cause.
- There were no allegations or findings that Mrs. Franco was negligent.
- The jury found damages of “zero” for Mr. Franco and also “zero” for Mrs. Franco, while separately finding Mrs. Franco incurred $2,212.92 in medical expenses.
- The trial court rendered judgment for defendants; the intermediate appellate court affirmed as to Mr. Franco but reversed and remanded as to Mrs. Franco based on the evidentiary insufficiency of the “zero” damages finding and upheld the statute governing ownership of personal-injury recoveries between spouses.

## Issues

1. Whether a statute providing that personal-injury recoveries during marriage are the injured spouse’s separate property (except loss of earning capacity during marriage) is constitutional under the Texas Constitution’s separate-property definition.
2. Whether the husband’s contributory negligence is imputed to the non-negligent wife to bar her recovery for her personal injuries.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Texas held the statute constitutional as construed.
- The Court held the husband’s negligence found by the jury was not imputed to the wife to bar her recovery.
- Mr. Franco’s lack of recovery remained based on his contributory negligence.
- Mrs. Franco’s claim was not barred by her husband’s negligence; her recoverable damages were to be characterized under the statute as construed.

## Legal Principles

- Damages for injury to the body (including pain and suffering, disfigurement, and impairment) are the injured spouse’s separate property.
- Damages for loss of earning capacity during marriage are community property.
- The constitutional definition of separate property may not be enlarged by statute; however, legislation is valid if construed consistently with constitutional limits on separate property.
- A spouse’s contributory negligence is not imputed to the other spouse to defeat the other spouse’s personal-injury claim when that spouse is free of fault, even if some elements of recovery may be community in character.

## Conclusion

The Texas Supreme Court sustained a statutory scheme that treats most personal-injury damages as the injured spouse’s separate property (while keeping lost earning capacity during marriage community) and rejected imputation of the negligent husband’s fault to a non-negligent wife, allowing her personal-injury claim to proceed on its own merits.


Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972)