Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)

Facts

  • Georgia used a “county unit system” to determine winners of statewide Democratic primary elections for U.S. Senator and other statewide offices.
  • Each county was assigned a fixed number of “unit votes” based on population brackets, and the candidate winning a county’s popular vote received all of that county’s unit votes.
  • A candidate could win the nomination by securing a majority of county unit votes even without winning a majority of the statewide popular vote.
  • The allocation of unit votes substantially favored less populous rural counties; counties with roughly one-third of the state’s population could control a majority of unit votes.
  • James O’Hear Sanders, a voter in Fulton County (the state’s most populous county), alleged the system diluted his vote compared with votes cast in small rural counties.
  • Sanders sued state and party officials; a three-judge federal district court held the system unconstitutional but issued relief that would have allowed a county-unit-style scheme with disparities no greater than the federal Electoral College.
  • State officials appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Whether Georgia’s county unit system for counting votes in statewide primary elections violates the Equal Protection Clause by weighting votes unequally based on county population.
  2. Whether the challenged primary-election rules constituted state action, Sanders had standing as a voter, and the case was moot due to a temporary shift to popular-vote counting in a particular election.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with directions to enjoin use of the county unit system entirely.
  • The Court held that regulation of the primary made the scheme part of the state’s election machinery and therefore state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • The Court found Sanders had standing because his vote was diluted by the weighting system.
  • The Court held the case was not moot because the statute remained in force and could govern future elections.
  • On the merits, the Court held the county unit system unconstitutionally diluted votes in more populous counties by giving disproportionate electoral power to voters in less populous counties.
  • The Court rejected the district court’s attempt to justify disparities by analogy to the federal Electoral College.
  • Equal protection in elections includes not only the right to cast a ballot but the right to have one’s vote counted with substantially equal weight in the same election.
  • A statewide election system that weights votes differently based solely on where voters reside, permitting a minority population to control election outcomes, denies equal protection.
  • State regulation of party primaries can constitute state action when the primary is integrated into the state’s election process.
  • A voter whose ballot is diluted by unequal weighting has standing to challenge the scheme.
  • A case is not moot where the challenged election statute remains effective and capable of governing future elections.
  • Political equality in statewide elections requires the rule of “one person, one vote”; states may not defend vote-weighting disparities by invoking federal constitutional compromises unique to the Electoral College.

Conclusion

The Court held that Georgia’s county unit system in statewide primaries violated the Equal Protection Clause by diluting votes in populous counties and ordered the system enjoined, articulating the constitutional requirement of “one person, one vote” for statewide elections.