## Facts

- Tamara Green, Therese Serignese, and Linda Traitz publicly accused William H. Cosby, Jr. of sexually assaulting them decades earlier.
- In response to media attention, statements attributed to Cosby’s attorney(s), publicist, and other representatives were published in national media disputing the accusers’ credibility.
- Green alleged a statement describing her accusation as a “discredited” allegation that “proved to be nothing” implied her accusation was false and had been rejected by some prior process.
- Serignese alleged statements describing allegations as “fabricated” and “unsubstantiated,” and suggesting accusers acted from improper motives, conveyed that she lied about criminal conduct.
- Traitz alleged statements highlighting a “long criminal record” and implying her accusation should not be believed portrayed her as dishonest and untrustworthy.
- Plaintiffs alleged Cosby authorized, directed, or was responsible for the publications and that the statements caused reputational harm.
- The action was brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction; Cosby moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

## Issues

1. Whether the challenged statements were nonactionable opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, or instead could reasonably be understood as asserting or implying false, defamatory facts about plaintiffs’ honesty.
2. Whether plaintiffs plausibly pleaded the elements of defamation under the applicable state law, including falsity, publication, fault, and harm.
3. Whether a common-law “self-defense” or “reply” privilege barred the claims at the pleading stage.
4. Whether Green’s claim was time-barred or timely due to alleged republication within the limitations period.

## Decision

- The court denied Cosby’s motions to dismiss in substantial part and allowed the defamation claims to proceed past Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court held the statements could plausibly be read to assert or imply verifiable facts (e.g., that accusations were “discredited,” “fabricated,” or “nothing”), not merely protected opinion.
- The court declined to dismiss based on a self-defense/reply privilege because applicability depended on fact-intensive questions such as good faith and proportionality.
- The court found Green plausibly alleged republication sufficient, at the pleading stage, to avoid dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds.

## Legal Principles

- A statement framed as “opinion” may be actionable if it implies undisclosed, defamatory facts or conveys an objectively verifiable factual assertion.
- At the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts accept well-pleaded allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor when assessing defamatory meaning and actionability.
- Assertions that an accuser’s allegations are “discredited,” “fabricated,” or “unsubstantiated” may be capable of defamatory meaning where they imply specific facts showing the accuser is lying.
- Common-law reply/self-defense protections, to the extent recognized, generally require contextual assessments (including good faith and proportionality) that are not typically resolved on the pleadings.
- Under republication principles, a new publication to a new audience may restart the limitations period, making timeliness dependent on when actionable republication occurred.

## Conclusion

The court held the plaintiffs plausibly stated defamation claims based on public statements disputing their accusations, rejected categorical dismissal based on opinion, privilege, and limitations arguments at the pleading stage, and permitted the case to proceed to factual development.


Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D. Mass. 2015)