Greenberg Traurig Hoffman Lipoff Rosen & Quentel, P.A. v. Bolton, 706 So. 2d 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

Facts

  • David Bolton held a 1991 final judgment against Marie Buscemi and attempted post-judgment discovery to locate and collect assets.
  • After unsuccessful efforts to serve Buscemi with a deposition notice, Bolton learned Buscemi was represented by Greenberg Traurig Hoffman Lipoff Rosen & Quentel, P.A., and two attorneys in a separate pending circuit court case.
  • In the judgment case, Bolton served deposition notices and subpoenas on the law firm seeking Buscemi’s whereabouts and information about her assets.
  • The law firm moved for a protective order and to quash, relying primarily on attorney-client privilege.
  • The trial court granted the protective order and quashed the subpoenas, but also ordered the law firm to accept service of a deposition notice for Buscemi and report how and when Buscemi was advised of the deposition.
  • The law firm sought certiorari review of the service-acceptance requirement; Bolton cross-petitioned to challenge the protective order and quashal of subpoenas.

Issues

  1. Whether a law firm that is not counsel of record for a judgment debtor in the post-judgment proceedings may be compelled to accept service of a deposition notice on the debtor’s behalf under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(b).
  2. Whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by granting a protective order and quashing subpoenas directed to the debtor’s attorneys seeking the debtor’s whereabouts and asset information.

Decision

  • The appellate court granted the law firm’s petition for certiorari and quashed the portion of the order requiring the firm to accept service of the deposition notice (and related reporting obligations).
  • The appellate court denied Bolton’s cross-petition, leaving intact the protective order and the quashal of subpoenas directed to the law firm.
  • Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(b) requires service on an attorney only when the party is represented by that attorney in the action where service is made; representation in a different case does not make the attorney an agent for service in the separate proceeding.
  • A trial court departs from the essential requirements of law when it compels a non-appearing attorney to undertake service-related duties for a party in an action where the attorney is not counsel of record.
  • Protective orders quashing discovery directed to counsel may be sustained where the requests implicate attorney-client privilege and certiorari review does not show a departure from essential legal requirements.

Conclusion

The court limited Rule 1.080(b) to counsel of record in the specific action, barring an order forcing unrelated counsel to accept service for a judgment debtor, and it upheld a protective order shielding the law firm from subpoenas seeking client location and asset information.