## Facts

- Gerald Spencer was found strangled in his Dallas home on June 29, 1983, after being dead for several days.
- On July 13, 1983, Dallas homicide investigators went to the home of Barbara Ann Griffin’s aunt, where Griffin (age sixteen at the time of the offense) was present.
- After speaking with officers, Griffin gave an oral statement about the homicide; the oral statement was not obtained in compliance with Texas Family Code § 51.09(b).
- Griffin was arrested, taken before a magistrate, given the statutory juvenile warnings required by Family Code § 51.09(b), and then gave a written statement.
- The juvenile court later waived jurisdiction and transferred the case for criminal proceedings; Griffin was tried as an adult in criminal district court.
- A jury convicted Griffin as a party to murder and assessed punishment at 15 years’ imprisonment.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding the written statement involuntary under a “cat-out-of-the-bag” theory because Griffin allegedly did not know the earlier oral statement was inadmissible.

## Issues

1. Whether a written confession taken in compliance with Family Code § 51.09(b) is involuntary solely because the defendant previously made a noncompliant oral statement and allegedly believed it could be used against her.
2. Whether, at a Jackson v. Denno hearing, the defendant must show a causal connection (a “but for” link) between the earlier statement and the later confession before the State must justify the admissibility of the earlier statement.
3. Whether the court of appeals erred by relying on juvenile-code confession provisions in its voluntariness analysis after the juvenile court waived jurisdiction and transferred the case for adult criminal prosecution.

## Decision

- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the conviction and sentence.
- The court rejected a per se rule that an earlier defective statement automatically taints a later confession taken with proper statutory safeguards.
- Because Griffin did not establish at the Jackson v. Denno hearing that she would not have given the written statement but for her belief about the earlier oral statement, the State had no burden to prove the oral statement’s admissibility as a prerequisite to admitting the written confession.
- On these facts, admitting the written confession did not violate due process.

## Legal Principles

- A later confession obtained in compliance with required warnings is not rendered involuntary merely because the defendant previously gave an earlier statement obtained without statutory compliance; automatic “cat-out-of-the-bag” taint is not the rule.
- To exclude a later confession based on an earlier improper statement, the defendant must show the earlier statement actually induced or caused the later confession (a “but for” causal link) in the voluntariness hearing.
- Absent that causal showing, the State is not required to prove the prior statement’s admissibility to support admission of the later confession.
- After transfer for adult prosecution, juvenile-code protections do not support expanding voluntariness doctrine beyond the statutory compliance shown for the statement admitted at trial.

## Conclusion

The court held that Griffin’s written confession—taken after a magistrate provided the statutory juvenile warnings—was admissible despite an earlier noncompliant oral statement, because Griffin failed to prove the earlier statement caused the later confession or made it involuntary.


Griffin v. State, 765 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)