## Facts

- Randall Lamont Griffith, a Black defendant, was convicted of first-degree robbery in Kentucky state court in 1982 after the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against prospective Black jurors.
- Griffith argued on appeal that the strikes violated equal protection; the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed under then-controlling precedent.
- Willie Davis Brown, also a Black defendant, was convicted of federal narcotics offenses in 1984 and challenged the exclusion of Black jurors through peremptory strikes; the Tenth Circuit affirmed under preexisting standards.
- Both defendants’ cases were pending before the U.S. Supreme Court on direct review when the Court decided *Batson v. Kentucky* (1986), which set a new equal-protection framework for discriminatory peremptory challenges.
- The Supreme Court consolidated the cases to decide whether *Batson* applies to cases still on direct review and not yet final when *Batson* was announced.

## Issues

1. Whether a new constitutional rule governing criminal prosecutions applies retroactively to state and federal cases pending on direct review or not yet final when the rule is announced.
2. Whether retroactivity on direct review depends on whether the new rule constitutes a “clear break” with prior precedent.

## Decision

- The Court (6–3, Justice Blackmun) held that new constitutional rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions apply to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final when the rule is announced.
- The Court rejected any exception for rules characterized as a “clear break” with past precedent.
- The Court reversed the judgments refusing to apply *Batson* and remanded for further proceedings consistent with applying *Batson* to these nonfinal cases.

## Legal Principles

- A newly declared constitutional rule of criminal procedure must be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final.
- Selective application of a new rule to some similarly situated defendants but not others is inconsistent with treating defendants equally and with the Court’s obligation to apply current law in cases on direct review.
- Retroactivity doctrine for direct review is categorical in this setting; different considerations may apply on collateral review.

## Conclusion

The Court required full retroactive application of new constitutional criminal-procedure rules to all nonfinal cases on direct review, ensuring defendants whose appeals were still pending received the benefit of *Batson* and eliminating a “clear break” exception in that context.


Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)