## Facts

- Grant A. Griffith was killed in a boating accident on Lake Williamstown, Kentucky, after being struck by a motorboat.
- The motorboat was co-owned by Donald S. Kuester and Cathleen (also spelled Kathleen in some sources) Kuester.
- Cathleen was operating the boat at the time of the accident; Donald was not present.
- Ann M. Griffith, as personal representative/administratrix of Grant Griffith’s estate, sued Cathleen for negligence (including negligence per se based on boating-law violations) and sued Donald on theories of vicarious liability as a co-owner spouse.
- Plaintiff sought to hold Donald vicariously liable under Kentucky’s family-purpose doctrine and also relied on a local ordinance regulating boating activity to argue for owner-based liability.
- The case was in federal court on diversity jurisdiction, so the district court applied Kentucky substantive law.
- The parties filed competing motions for partial summary judgment: Donald sought judgment on the vicarious-liability theories; plaintiff sought judgment that Cathleen was negligent (including negligence per se) as a matter of law.

## Issues

1. Under Kentucky law, can the family-purpose doctrine make an absent co-owner spouse (Donald) vicariously liable for the alleged negligent operation of a co-owned boat by the other spouse (Cathleen)?
2. Does a local ordinance regulating boating create civil, vicarious owner liability that would make Donald liable for Cathleen’s operation of the boat?
3. Is plaintiff entitled to partial summary judgment that Cathleen was negligent (including negligent per se), or do genuine disputes of material fact remain on breach and causation?

## Decision

- The court granted Donald Kuester’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s family-purpose doctrine theory of vicarious liability.
- The court granted Donald Kuester’s motion for partial summary judgment on the ordinance-based theory of vicarious liability.
- The court denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment against Cathleen on negligence and negligence per se because genuine issues of material fact remained, including on causation.

## Legal Principles

- In a diversity case, the federal court applies state substantive law; Kentucky law governed the vicarious-liability and negligence questions.
- Kentucky’s family-purpose doctrine is grounded in vicarious-liability/agency concepts and requires facts showing the defendant “furnished” the vehicle (or vessel) for family use and retained a right of control over its use.
- Equal co-ownership by spouses, without proof that one spouse had a superior right to control the other spouse’s use of the boat, is not enough to impose vicarious liability under the family-purpose doctrine, especially where the proposed vicarious tortfeasor was not present at the incident.
- A local safety ordinance will not be read to create private, civil vicarious liability against an owner absent clear text showing an intent to impose that type of liability.
- Negligence per se based on a statutory or regulatory violation still requires proof of causation; the plaintiff must show the violation was a substantial factor in producing the injury.
- Summary judgment is improper when reasonable jurors could differ on material facts bearing on breach and proximate cause, such as what happened immediately before impact and whether any proven violation caused the death.

## Conclusion

The Eastern District of Kentucky granted partial summary judgment for Donald Kuester because Kentucky’s family-purpose doctrine and the cited local ordinance did not make an absent co-owner spouse vicariously liable for the other spouse’s operation of a co-owned boat, and it denied plaintiff’s bid for summary judgment against Cathleen Kuester because disputed facts remained on negligence and whether any alleged rule violations caused Grant Griffith’s death.


Griffith v. Kuester, 780 F. Supp. 2d 536 (2011)