## Facts

- In 1926, a married couple acquired a leasehold interest and furniture for a 38-room San Francisco rooming house using commingled funds, including the husband’s earnings and the wife’s separate funds.
- After 1927, worn furniture was replaced with new furniture purchased with proceeds from operating the rooming house.
- In 1930, the couple purchased real property in San Mateo County using commingled funds.
- In 1933, the husband negligently caused an automobile collision.
- In 1935, a tort judgment was entered against the husband alone.
- The judgment creditor caused execution to issue and the sheriffs levied on the rooming-house leasehold and furniture and on the San Mateo real property.
- The wife filed a third-party claim to the San Francisco personal property; a third party claimed the San Mateo real property under a deed for which no consideration was paid.
- In the execution-related proceedings, the trial court determined the levied assets were community property.
- The spouses filed a separate equity action seeking a permanent injunction to stop the execution sales; the trial court entered judgment for defendants, denying permanent injunctive relief.
- Only the wife appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether, after Civil Code § 161a recognized spouses’ “present, existing and equal interests” in community property, community property remained liable to execution for a tort judgment against the husband alone.
2. Whether the assets levied upon were properly characterized as community property rather than the wife’s separate property.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for defendants, leaving the execution sales unobstructed.
- The Court held that community property could be reached to satisfy a tort judgment against the husband alone, notwithstanding Civil Code § 161a.
- The Court accepted the trial court’s determination that the levied leasehold, furniture, and real property were community property on the record presented.
- Because the assets were community and community property was liable for the husband’s tort judgment, the wife was not entitled to a permanent injunction restraining execution.

## Legal Principles

- Civil Code § 161a’s recognition of equal spousal interests in community property did not, by itself, alter the community estate’s exposure to the husband’s debts, including tort liabilities.
- So long as statutory management and control of community property remained with the husband under Civil Code §§ 172 (community personal property) and 172a (community real property), community property could be subjected to execution for judgments against the husband alone, including tort judgments.
- Property acquired with commingled funds, and replacements purchased with profits from community operations, supports characterization of the assets as community property absent proof tracing a separate-property interest sufficient to exempt the assets from execution.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed denial of injunctive relief and held that, despite Civil Code § 161a’s declaration of equal spousal interests, community property remained subject to execution to satisfy a tort judgment against the husband alone where the husband retained statutory management and control and the levied assets were properly found to be community property.


Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679 (Cal. 1941)