## Facts

- William Grutzmacher was a socially and politically active Chicago business consultant who had run for mayor and regularly publicized his political and social views.
- Grutzmacher circulated his views through talk shows and through written and spoken materials, including a manuscript, speeches, fliers, newsletters, and public appearances.
- Steve Neal, a political columnist for the *Chicago Sun-Times*, published a column in the newspaper’s editorial section criticizing a congressman’s tactics and, in that discussion, compared the congressman’s alleged stirring of ethnic prejudice to those of “Neo-Nazi Bill Grutzmacher.”
- Grutzmacher sued Neal and the *Sun-Times* for libel based on the “neo-Nazi” characterization.
- After extensive discovery, defendants assembled evidence offered to support the characterization as a value judgment drawn from Grutzmacher’s own statements and associations, including that:
  - Others had described his speeches as anti-Semitic, racist, white supremacist, or consistent with neo-Nazi views;
  - He attacked a watchdog organization as a “phony front” for the American Jewish Committee;
  - His manuscript contained themes others compared to those in Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*;
  - He stated he was thankful his children were born in “White Man’s America” and advocated sterilization of certain groups;
  - He appeared as the featured speaker at a German-American celebration where leaflets stating “HOLOCAUST: SIX MILLION JEW LIES” were distributed; and
  - He endorsed for alderman a person identified as the American Nazi Party’s national vice-chairman.
- Neal and the *Sun-Times* moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statement was not defamatory per se, was protected opinion in an editorial column, and that Grutzmacher (as a public figure, at least for the disputes he entered) could not prove actual malice.

## Issues

1. Whether labeling the plaintiff “Neo-Nazi Bill Grutzmacher” in an editorial-page political column is actionable defamation (including defamation per se) or instead a protected expression of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole.
2. Whether Grutzmacher was a public figure (at least for the controversy tied to his public advocacy) and, if so, whether the evidence could support a finding that defendants published with actual malice.

## Decision

- The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, granted summary judgment for Steve Neal and the *Chicago Sun-Times*.
- The court treated the “neo-Nazi” label, as used in a political opinion column, as nonactionable opinion and rhetorical hyperbole rather than a provably false factual assertion.
- The court determined that Grutzmacher’s extensive voluntary participation in public political and social disputes triggered the constitutional fault standard applicable to public-figure plaintiffs.
- On the record developed in discovery, the court found no triable basis to conclude defendants acted with actual malice, given the evidentiary support defendants cited for the characterization.
- Secondary accounts report the court relied on reasoning similar to *Stevens v. Tillman* (7th Cir. 1988), which treated labels like “racist” in political disputes as value-laden epithets not readily provable true or false.

## Legal Principles

- Public-figure (or limited-purpose public-figure) defamation plaintiffs must prove actual malice: knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether the statement was false.
- Actual malice is a subjective standard; it is not satisfied by showing poor investigation, hostility, or negligent error without proof the speaker seriously doubted truth.
- In evaluating whether language is fact or opinion, courts consider the full setting and how an ordinary reader would understand the words, including placement in an editorial/opinion section and the tone of political commentary.
- Value-charged political epithets (such as “neo-Nazi”), when used to condemn a person’s publicly expressed ideas or associations rather than to assert a specific, verifiable event, may be protected opinion or rhetorical hyperbole.
- Where a challenged characterization is tied to disclosed or widely available facts about the plaintiff’s own statements, writings, and affiliations, it is less likely to be treated as asserting an undisclosed defamatory fact.
- Summary judgment is proper when, even viewing the evidence favorably to the plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find the required constitutional fault standard.

## Conclusion

The court entered judgment for the newspaper and columnist because, in the setting of an editorial political column, calling Grutzmacher a “neo-Nazi” was treated as a constitutionally protected, value-laden characterization rather than a verifiable factual accusation, and Grutzmacher—given his highly public role in political disputes—failed to present evidence from which a jury could find actual malice.


Grutzmacher v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 1994 WL 742257 (1994)