## Facts

- Gulf Oil Trading Co. supplied marine fuel (“bunkers”) to the M/V Caribe Mar, which was time-chartered by Uiterwyk Corporation from the vessel’s owner.
- The charter party included a prohibition-of-lien clause barring the charterer from incurring liens superior to the owner’s interest.
- In December 1982, Uiterwyk ordered bunkers for delivery in Houston; Gulf confirmed the sale on terms asserting a lien for the purchase price of fuel used by the vessel and hired a separate company to perform the physical delivery.
- During the Houston bunkering operation, the vessel’s master told the physical deliverer about the prohibition-of-lien clause; the delivery was completed, and Gulf learned of the clause about two days later.
- About one month later, Gulf supplied additional bunkers to the vessel at Ceuta, Morocco on Uiterwyk’s order after Gulf had actual knowledge of the charter’s prohibition-of-lien clause.
- Uiterwyk failed to pay for both deliveries, and Gulf filed an in rem action against the vessel seeking maritime liens for both bunker supplies under the Federal Maritime Lien Act.

## Issues

1. Whether a maritime lien arises for bunkers supplied in Houston when the supplier lacked actual knowledge of a prohibition-of-lien clause, but the vessel’s master notified the physical deliverer during delivery.
2. Whether a maritime lien arises for bunkers supplied later in Ceuta when the supplier had actual knowledge of the prohibition-of-lien clause before supplying the fuel.
3. Whether “lien” language in the supplier’s sales documents can create or preserve a maritime lien despite statutory requirements and notice of restricted authority.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lien for the Houston delivery.
- The court held the vessel did not defeat the statutory presumption of charterer authority because Gulf lacked actual knowledge at the time the necessaries were furnished, and the subcontract deliverer’s notice was not shown to be imputable to Gulf so as to negate the lien.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of a lien for the Ceuta delivery.
- The court held that Gulf’s actual knowledge of the prohibition-of-lien clause before the Ceuta supply rebutted the statutory presumption of authority and prevented any lien from arising for that later delivery.
- The court treated Gulf’s contractual lien language as supportive of intent where the statute allowed a lien, but insufficient to create a lien contrary to the statutory scheme or despite actual notice.

## Legal Principles

- A supplier furnishing “necessaries” to a vessel on the order of a charterer may obtain a maritime lien under the Federal Maritime Lien Act unless the supplier has actual knowledge that the charterer lacks authority to bind the vessel.
- A charter-party prohibition-of-lien clause is effective against a supplier only if the supplier has actual knowledge of the clause at the time the necessaries are furnished.
- Notice acquired after performance does not retroactively extinguish a lien that attached when the necessaries were provided.
- Knowledge of a prohibition-of-lien clause communicated to an independent physical deliverer is not automatically imputed to the seller-supplier; the vessel bears the burden to prove imputation sufficient to defeat the lien.
- Contract terms asserting a “lien” may evidence reliance on vessel credit when a statutory lien is available, but they cannot create a maritime lien where the statute does not, or override actual notice of restricted authority.

## Conclusion

The court allowed a maritime lien for the Houston bunkers because the supplier lacked actual knowledge of the charter’s no-lien clause when the fuel was furnished and the deliverer’s notice was not shown to be imputable to the supplier, but it denied a lien for the later Ceuta delivery because the supplier provided fuel with actual knowledge that the charter prohibited liens.


Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. M/V Caribe Mar, 757 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1985)