## Facts

- Pillsbury acquired Haagen-Dazs in 1983 and competed in the super-premium ice cream market against Double Rainbow and Perche No! Gelato.
- Consolidated antitrust actions challenged whether Haagen-Dazs’ distribution policies violated antitrust laws.
- Double Rainbow was represented by a Minneapolis firm (Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett) and separate San Francisco counsel.
- Franklin C. Jesse previously served as in-house counsel at Pillsbury and worked on matters involving Haagen-Dazs, including distribution-policy issues.
- Jesse later joined the Gray firm while it represented Double Rainbow in litigation adverse to Pillsbury/Haagen-Dazs.
- Pillsbury/Haagen-Dazs moved to disqualify Jesse, the Gray firm, and Double Rainbow’s other counsel, and sought an order barring representation in substantially related matters.
- The Gray firm implemented screening measures intended to prevent Jesse from participating in, accessing, or discussing the Double Rainbow litigation.

## Issues

1. Whether Jesse’s prior in-house work for Pillsbury/Haagen-Dazs was substantially related to the pending antitrust litigation such that he had to be personally disqualified.
2. Whether any conflict arising from Jesse’s prior representation had to be imputed to the Gray firm and Double Rainbow’s other counsel, requiring their disqualification.
3. Whether the Gray firm’s screening procedures were sufficient to avoid imputed disqualification in the circumstances presented.
4. Whether the requested disqualification relief, including prospective bars in other substantially related litigation, was overbroad.

## Decision

- The court disqualified Jesse from participating in the litigation on Double Rainbow’s behalf.
- The court denied the motion to disqualify the Gray firm and Double Rainbow’s other counsel.
- The court rejected the request for broader, prospective disqualification beyond what was necessary to address Jesse’s conflict.

## Legal Principles

- A former client seeking disqualification must show a substantial relationship between the prior representation and the current adverse matter; if shown, the attorney is presumed to have had access to confidential information.
- Disqualification protects client confidences and the integrity of the proceedings, but it is a drastic remedy and should be ordered only to the extent necessary.
- Conflicts may be imputed to a lawyer’s firm, but timely and effective screening may, on an adequate record, prevent firm-wide disqualification.
- Disqualification motions should not be used tactically; remedies should be tailored to the demonstrated risk to former-client confidences.

## Conclusion

Because Jesse’s prior in-house work concerning Haagen-Dazs’ distribution policies was substantially related to the antitrust claims, he was personally disqualified, but the court allowed Double Rainbow’s remaining counsel to continue where the firm’s screening measures sufficiently protected Pillsbury/Haagen-Dazs’ confidential information and the requested broader relief exceeded what was warranted.


Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1986)