## Facts

- Yale required all unmarried freshmen and sophomores under age 21 to live in on-campus dormitories, which were coeducational.
- Plaintiffs were Yale undergraduates who alleged that, as devout Orthodox Jews, living in coeducational dorms conflicted with their religious obligations.
- Plaintiffs challenged the housing requirement as: (a) unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (arguing Yale acted under color of state law); (b) unlawful under Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2 as an illegal tying arrangement and monopolization of a New Haven housing market; and (c) unlawful under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) for refusing a religious exemption.
- The district court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
- Plaintiffs appealed; one judge later dissented in part as to the FHA issue.

## Issues

1. Whether Yale and its administrators acted under color of state law so that plaintiffs could pursue constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Whether the mandatory on-campus housing rule plausibly stated Sherman Act claims for illegal tying (15 U.S.C. § 1) or monopolization (15 U.S.C. § 2).
3. Whether plaintiffs plausibly stated, and had standing to bring, an FHA claim based on Yale’s refusal to exempt them from coeducational dormitory living.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of all federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court held Yale was not a state actor; the challenged housing policy was not fairly attributable to the state.
- The court held the complaint did not plausibly plead the market power, relevant market, or anticompetitive effects necessary for tying or monopolization claims.
- The court held the FHA claim failed on the pleaded facts; the majority concluded the policy was applied uniformly without regard to religion and did not amount to discriminatory denial of housing.
- A partial dissent would have allowed the FHA claim to proceed beyond the pleading stage for factual development.

## Legal Principles

- Constitutional free-exercise and related claims generally constrain governmental conduct; a private entity is subject to § 1983 only when its conduct is fairly attributable to the state under recognized state-action tests (e.g., coercion/encouragement, joint participation, or comparable close nexus).
- Government benefits, regulation, or a charter relationship with the state, without more connection to the challenged decision, do not transform a private university into a state actor.
- Sherman Act tying and monopolization claims require plausible allegations of a properly defined market and market power, along with anticompetitive effects; institutional rules tied to educational and social objectives are not, without more, restraints of trade.
- FHA liability typically targets discriminatory denial of housing or discriminatory terms and conditions based on protected characteristics; a uniform housing policy not based on religion may fail to state an FHA claim absent plausible allegations of prohibited discrimination under the statute.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of students’ challenge to Yale’s coeducational on-campus housing requirement, concluding Yale was not a state actor for § 1983 purposes, the antitrust claims inadequately alleged market power and anticompetitive harm, and the FHA allegations did not state a viable claim on the pleaded facts, despite a partial dissent that would have allowed further development of the FHA theory.


Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000)