## Facts

- Robert Haddad worked for Lockheed California Corporation from 1969 until resigning in July 1979.
- Haddad claimed he was subjected to disparate treatment based on national origin (Title VII) and age (ADEA) and asserted his resignation amounted to constructive discharge.
- Haddad filed an EEOC charge, received a right-to-sue notice, and sued in federal district court.
- The Title VII national-origin claim was tried to the judge; the ADEA age-discrimination claim was tried to a jury.
- The district court entered judgment for Lockheed on the Title VII claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Lockheed on the ADEA claim.
- Over Haddad’s objection, the court admitted testimony from his ex-wife that about two years before he resigned, Haddad said he planned to quit Lockheed and pursue a different career.
- Other evidence indicated Haddad was dissatisfied at Lockheed and was exploring alternative career paths before his resignation.
- The court admitted management testimony relaying co-worker complaints about working with Haddad, offered to show what information management relied on in making decisions.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury that Haddad had to prove Lockheed intended to discriminate to prevail on his ADEA claim tried as disparate treatment.
2. Whether management testimony repeating co-worker complaints was inadmissible hearsay.
3. Whether admission of Haddad’s ex-wife’s testimony violated marital privilege and, if so, whether the error required reversal or was subject to civil harmless-error review.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Lockheed on the Title VII claim and the jury’s verdict for Lockheed on the ADEA claim.
- The court held the “intent to discriminate” instruction was proper because Haddad tried the ADEA case as disparate treatment, which requires proof of intentional discrimination.
- The court held the co-worker complaint evidence was not hearsay because it was admitted to show what management was told and relied upon, not to prove the complaints were true.
- Assuming the ex-wife’s testimony was privileged, the court held any error in admitting it was harmless because similar evidence showed Haddad contemplated leaving for reasons independent of discrimination.

## Legal Principles

- In employment discrimination cases tried as disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination; a jury instruction requiring intent is proper when the case is presented on that theory.
- Out-of-court statements are not hearsay when admitted to show their effect on the listener or the information available to a decisionmaker, rather than for their truth.
- In civil cases, erroneous admission of evidence that may be protected by marital privilege is reviewed under ordinary harmless-error principles; reversal is not automatic, and cumulative evidence supports a finding of harmlessness.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld Lockheed’s trial victories, ruling that intent is a required element for an ADEA disparate-treatment case, management could recount co-worker complaints to show the basis for decisions, and any improper admission of ex-spousal testimony was harmless in light of other evidence that Haddad planned to resign regardless of alleged discrimination.


Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1983)