## Facts

- Barbara Hafer became Auditor General of Pennsylvania and discharged James Melo, Jr., and other office employees after taking office.
- The discharged employees sued Hafer for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging their terminations violated federal constitutional rights.
- The complaint sought to impose liability on Hafer personally for actions taken using her state authority as Auditor General.

## Issues

1. Whether a state official may be held personally liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct undertaken as part of official duties.
2. Whether state officials sued in their individual capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, notwithstanding that the challenged acts were performed under state authority.
3. Whether the rule that bars § 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities also bars individual-capacity damages claims based on the same conduct.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment allowing the § 1983 damages action to proceed against Hafer in her individual capacity.
- The Court held that state officers may be personally liable for damages under § 1983 for actions taken under color of state law, even when those actions are official in character.
- The Court clarified that the statement that state officials “acting in their official capacities” are not “persons” under § 1983 refers to the capacity in which the officer is sued (official capacity), not the character of the acts that caused the alleged injury.
- The Court rejected the argument that treating official acts as acts of the State would categorically preclude individual-capacity liability; defenses for officials come from established immunity doctrines.

## Legal Principles

- Official-capacity suits are treated as suits against the State; § 1983 damages are unavailable in such suits because the State (and officials sued in that capacity) is not a “person” for damages under § 1983, and sovereign immunity concerns apply.
- Individual-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability on an officer for actions taken under color of state law; in that posture, the officer is a “person” under § 1983.
- Conduct is taken “under color of” state law when the official acts by virtue of state authority; acting within the scope of official duties does not, by itself, bar individual-capacity liability.
- Protection for officials facing individual-capacity damages claims is supplied by applicable immunity defenses (e.g., qualified immunity), not by excluding such defendants from § 1983’s coverage.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 1983 permits damages suits against state officials in their individual capacities for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, even when the challenged conduct consists of actions taken in the course of official duties; only official-capacity damages claims are barred on the “not a person” theory.


Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)