## Facts

- In 1925, Clifford Hagaman’s parents conveyed real property in Woodbridge Township, New Jersey, to the local board of education by deed.
- The deed stated it was the parties’ “understanding” that the land was conveyed “solely for the purpose” of erecting and maintaining a public school, that a school would be built by the 1926 school year, and that the building would be used for school purposes.
- The board built a school on the property and used it for school purposes until about 1968.
- Around 1968, the board closed the school and reassigned students to other schools.
- The board continued to use the property as a recreational playground with equipment and supervised activities.
- Hagaman, as heir of the grantors, claimed the board’s cessation of school use terminated the board’s estate or breached a condition so the property should revert to him.
- After the trial court entered judgment, the school building on the property was destroyed by fire on March 2, 1971.

## Issues

1. Whether the deed’s “solely for the purpose” school-use language created a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter.
2. Whether the deed created a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent with a right of reentry.
3. If no defeasible estate was created, whether the board held fee simple absolute despite discontinuing operation of a school on the site.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment for the board and dismissal of Hagaman’s complaint.
- The court held the deed did not clearly create either a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.
- The board took a fee simple absolute; discontinuing school operation did not give Hagaman a right to possession.

## Legal Principles

- Deeds are construed to convey a fee simple absolute unless the instrument clearly manifests an intent to create a lesser or defeasible estate.
- Forfeitures are disfavored; language alleged to create a determinable fee or a condition subsequent must be clear and unequivocal.
- Statements of purpose or motive (including “solely for the purpose” of a specified use), without limiting words of duration or an express reverter/reentry provision, do not create a defeasible fee.
- Absent express terms providing for automatic termination or reserved reentry, courts will not imply reversionary rights from ambiguous use-related language.

## Conclusion

Because the deed lacked clear words of limitation, reverter, or reentry, the conveyance was construed as a fee simple absolute, and the board’s closure of the school did not divest title or entitle the grantors’ heir to recover possession.


Hagaman v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Woodbridge, 117 N.J. Super. 446 (App. Div. 1971)