## Facts

- Mark Hagans, a former security guard and sanitation worker, received disability insurance benefits after a dissecting aortic aneurysm in January 2003, open-heart surgery, and rehabilitation, with additional documented conditions including hypertension and depression.
- Benefits began effective January 30, 2003.
- On September 21, 2004, the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined Hagans’s disability had ceased as of September 1, 2004, based on medical improvement reflected in updated medical reports and a Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) assessment.
- Medical evidence included an August 31, 2004 report from treating physician Dr. Ramesh Patel and a September 15, 2004 RFC assessment by SSA physician Dr. Burton Gillette, among other contemporaneous assessments.
- After a 2008 administrative hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the cessation decision on February 26, 2009, finding Hagans could not perform past work but could perform other jobs identified by a vocational expert (e.g., ticket seller, product assembler) in significant numbers.
- Hagans relied in part on a 2009 statement from Dr. Patel asserting he was “totally and permanently disabled,” without a contemporaneous explanation tied to the September 2004 cessation period.
- The district court affirmed, reviewing disability status as of September 1, 2004; Hagans appealed, arguing the proper “current” disability date was the ALJ hearing or decision.

## Issues

1. Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(f), must “current” disability in a cessation case be evaluated as of the initial cessation date or as of later administrative proceedings (ALJ hearing/decision)?
2. What level of deference, if any, is owed to the SSA’s Acquiescence Ruling 92-2(6), which instructs adjudicators to evaluate disability as of the initial cessation determination?
3. Was the ALJ’s finding that Hagans’s disability ceased on September 1, 2004 supported by substantial evidence?

## Decision

- The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment upholding termination of benefits as of September 1, 2004.
- The court held § 423(f) is ambiguous as to the temporal reference point for assessing “current” disability in cessation cases.
- The court held Acquiescence Ruling 92-2(6) lacks the force of law and is not entitled to Chevron deference; it may receive Skidmore weight based on persuasiveness.
- Applying Skidmore, the court found the initial cessation-date focus consistent with the statute and the cessation framework.
- The court concluded substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding of medical improvement and capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers as of the cessation date.

## Legal Principles

- When statutory text concerning “current” status can reasonably bear more than one temporal meaning in context, the statute may be treated as ambiguous on timing.
- Informal agency policy statements that lack the force of law and were not promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking do not receive Chevron deference.
- Such agency interpretations may receive Skidmore deference, with weight depending on thoroughness, reasoning, and consistency.
- In disability-cessation cases under § 423(f), termination requires medical improvement related to the ability to work and a supported finding that the claimant can engage in substantial gainful activity.
- Judicial review of an ALJ’s cessation finding is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the decision; later medical opinions may be discounted if not meaningfully linked to the relevant cessation period.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit held that § 423(f) does not clearly require assessing disability at the time of the ALJ hearing or decision, treated the SSA’s acquiescence ruling as entitled at most to Skidmore weight, and affirmed the ALJ’s determination—supported by substantial evidence—that Hagans’s disability ceased on the initial cessation date.


Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2012)