## Facts

- Debra Hagen was the victim in a criminal case in which James J. Kelly was indicted for rape and indecent assault and battery, convicted by a jury in 1987, and sentenced in 1988.
- Execution of Kelly’s sentence was stayed pending appeal after Kelly sought posttrial relief, including a motion for a new trial.
- The postconviction and appellate proceedings became protracted, including dismissal of an appeal due to an incomplete record and extended periods of inactivity while attempting to reconstruct the transcript.
- In 2001, the Commonwealth moved in Superior Court to revoke the long-standing stay of execution.
- Hagen separately moved to revoke the stay or to obtain a warrant for Kelly’s custody, relying on the Massachusetts Victim’s Bill of Rights provision recognizing a victim’s right to a “prompt disposition” of the case.
- The Superior Court ruled Hagen was not a party and lacked standing to seek revocation, but allowed her counsel to be heard in connection with the Commonwealth’s motion; the court denied revocation.
- Hagen sought extraordinary relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3; a single justice denied relief for lack of standing, and Hagen appealed to the full Supreme Judicial Court.

## Issues

1. Whether G.L. c. 258B, § 3(f) gives a crime victim standing to file motions or intervene in a criminal case to enforce the statutory right to a prompt disposition, including seeking revocation of a stay of sentence execution.
2. Whether denying victim standing to seek such relief violates state or federal due process where execution of the sentence has been substantially delayed.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice’s denial of extraordinary relief.
- The court held that a crime victim is not a party to a criminal prosecution and lacks standing to file motions or intervene in postconviction proceedings absent explicit statutory authorization.
- The court held that G.L. c. 258B, § 3(f) does not create a judicially enforceable right permitting a victim to seek revocation of a stay of execution or similar relief as a litigant.
- The court stated that when a victim asserts the statutory right to a prompt disposition is jeopardized, the victim (or counsel) should be given an opportunity to address the court at relevant proceedings.
- The court rejected the claim that denial of standing violated due process.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal prosecutions are brought in the name of the Commonwealth; crime victims generally have no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or punishment of another person that confers party status.
- G.L. c. 258B confers informational and participatory rights on victims but does not expand the class of parties or imply a private right to litigate motions within the criminal case.
- The statutory right to a “prompt disposition” (G.L. c. 258B, § 3(f)) is not an independent, judicially enforceable entitlement to compel particular prosecutorial or judicial action (such as revoking a stay of sentence execution).
- As a matter of administering the statutory scheme, courts should permit a victim asserting the prompt-disposition right to be heard when delay or other circumstances place that right at risk.
- Denial of victim standing to control or compel steps in a criminal prosecution does not, by itself, violate state or federal due process.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Judicial Court held that a victim’s statutory right to a prompt disposition does not confer standing to intervene or file motions in a criminal case, while requiring courts to allow victims an opportunity to be heard when delay threatens that statutory interest.


Hagen v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 374, 772 N.E.2d 32 (Mass. 2002)