## Facts

- Stephen C. Haglund was a long-term cigarette smoker who died of lung cancer.
- Brenda Haglund, as executrix of his estate, brought a wrongful-death products-liability action against Philip Morris Inc.
- The claim proceeded under Massachusetts implied warranty of merchantability, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 2-314(2)(c).
- Philip Morris asserted an affirmative defense that the decedent’s decision to begin and continue smoking was “unreasonable use” under the doctrine recognized in *Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.*
- The plaintiff sought to preclude that defense, arguing it should be unavailable in cigarette cases because cigarettes are inherently dangerous when used for their ordinary purpose.
- The trial judge treated the plaintiff’s motion as a motion to strike the defense, denied it, and then dismissed the action sua sponte.
- The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) granted direct appellate review.

## Issues

1. Whether a cigarette manufacturer may assert a *Correia*-type “unreasonable use” defense in a wrongful-death action based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
2. Whether the record supported dismissal as a matter of law on the ground that the decedent’s cigarette use was “unreasonable.”
3. Whether the manufacturer was quasi-estopped from asserting “unreasonable use” based on its public representations or litigation positions.

## Decision

- The SJC held that, in the normal course, a cigarette manufacturer generally may not rely on the *Correia* “unreasonable use” defense in a warranty-of-merchantability tobacco case because cigarettes are inherently dangerous and cannot be safely used for their ordinary purpose.
- The SJC declined to impose a categorical, across-the-board legal bar on the defense in all cigarette cases, leaving open a narrow possibility of the defense where the consumer’s conduct is “overwhelmingly unreasonable” in light of particularized knowledge of heightened medical risk.
- The SJC affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defense (as treated by the trial judge).
- The SJC reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded, concluding the record was insufficiently developed to decide “unreasonable use” as a matter of law.
- The SJC rejected the plaintiff’s quasi-estoppel theory as a basis to prevent assertion of the defense.

## Legal Principles

- Implied warranty of merchantability under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 2-314(2)(c) requires that goods be fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used; Massachusetts warranty doctrine largely tracks Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A principles.
- Under *Correia*, a user’s negligence does not bar warranty recovery except where the user knowingly and unreasonably uses a product that is defective and dangerous.
- The policy rationale for the *Correia* defense presumes a product that is ordinarily capable of reasonably safe use, such that the user’s knowing, unreasonable exposure to a known defect justifies a complete bar.
- Because cigarettes are inherently dangerous when used as intended (smoking), the *Correia* framework will usually not apply; there is generally no “reasonable” ordinary use that can serve as the baseline for identifying “unreasonable use” in the *Correia* sense.
- The defense may remain available in exceptional circumstances where individualized facts show the consumer’s conduct was overwhelmingly unreasonable in light of specific knowledge of a medical condition and the particularized risks smoking posed to that condition at the relevant time.
- Quasi-estoppel does not categorically bar a cigarette manufacturer from asserting an otherwise available affirmative defense; any such defense must be evaluated on the facts and governing doctrine.

## Conclusion

The SJC ruled that the *Correia* unreasonable-use defense is ordinarily inapplicable in warranty-based cigarette litigation because cigarettes are inherently dangerous when used for their ordinary purpose, but the defense is not absolutely foreclosed; it reversed a sua sponte dismissal because the existing record did not justify judgment as a matter of law and remanded for further proceedings.


Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc., 446 Mass. 741, 847 N.E.2d 315 (2006)